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Abstract 
Poland is home to arguably the most loyal and devout Catholics in Europe. A brief examination 
of the country‟s history indicates that Polish society has been subjected to a variety of politically, 
religiously, and socially oppressive forces that have continually tested the strength of allegiance 
to the Catholic Church. Through the partition period, the Nazi and Soviet invasions during World 
War II, and the institution of communist power following the close of World War II, the Polish 
people met religious hostility that threatened to permanently sever Polish faith to the Catholic 
Church. However, despite attempts to break Polish allegiance to the Catholic Church, Polish 
faith did not diminish, and in the case of the communist era, it strengthened. This thesis will 
argue that Polish loyalty to the Catholic Church is a product of historical associations of 
Catholicism as a symbol of national identity in addition to the guidance and leadership provided 
by a number of prominent Polish Catholic officials. With these two factors, the Catholic Church 
in Poland was able to overcome ideological and logistical barriers placed by the communist 
regime in order to maintain feelings of hope and optimism among the Polish people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 For the past half century, identifying as Polish has become synonymous with identifying 
as Roman Catholic. Polish people are famously known for their considerable dedication to the 
Roman Catholic Church; the latest statistics indicate that a little over 33 million out of Poland‟s 
population of 38 million people adhere to Catholicism.
1
 While this demonstrates that Poland has 
a population that is almost completely saturated with Roman Catholics, many of whom attend 
church weekly, it is imperative to point out that this was not always the case. In fact, the 
existence of an overwhelming majority of Catholics in Poland is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
The institution of Catholicism in Poland dates back over one thousand years, but the Catholic 
Church was not the predominant religious institution for a substantial portion of that time. 
Eventually, Poland became known for its centuries-long acceptance of religious diversity and 
tolerance; however, a complete examination of Poland‟s historical background thoroughly 
explains the reasons for the absence of religious diversity in modern times.  
There is no question that the Catholic Church has played a significant role in the many 
events of this country‟s complex history, but it is important to point out that the establishment of 
the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was not in itself what made the Church a major 
contributor to Polish history. Rather, the Polish people “utilize[d], change[d], and sustain[ed]” 
the development of the Roman Catholic Church.
2
 It is both the Poles‟ expression of their faith, 
along with the policies enacted by the Church that led to lasting support of Catholicism. What is 
currently identified as irrefutable loyalty to the Catholic Church results not merely from the 
Church‟s long-term existence in Poland, but also from centuries of political, philosophical, and 
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religious evolution that provided Poles with reasons to further explore and identify with 
Catholicism. The Church‟s longstanding influence and the long-lasting reference to Poland as the 
“shield of Christendom” would not be worthy of discussion without Poles‟ continual expression 
of faith and loyalty.
3
 
 It is also important to recognize that not all actions of the Catholic Church or its 
representatives in Poland reflected the core teachings of Roman Catholicism. Instead, at times, 
the path upon which the Polish people were led was contradictory to the fundamental principles 
of Christianity as a whole. In some instances, especially in relation to Polish affairs, the Church 
failed in its responsibility as a religious institution to abide by and uphold its central beliefs, “yet 
Poland, the Polish people, kept sending their treasure to Rome and their sons to death for the 
faith they embraced.”4 How is it possible that a people who have continually faced substantial 
hardship find solace in their faith? Even more remarkable is the ability of Poles to maintain their 
strong sense of connection to the Catholic Church when the Church has not always exhibited the 
same caliber of loyalty towards them. This was especially evident in the Church‟s refusal to 
place pressure on the partitioning powers whose oppressive methods of governing illustrate some 
of the darkest years in Polish history. However, regardless of the Church‟s various refusals to 
support the aspirations of the population, it is evident that Poles have used their expression of 
faith and devotion to the Roman Catholic Church in order to provide themselves with a sense of 
nationalism and unity. This thesis will explore the historical rationale behind Polish commitment 
to the Catholic Church in an attempt to reach a deeper understanding of how Poland was able to 
preserve its religious convictions during the religiously suppressive communist regime of the 
20
th
 century. Through discussions of policy and central religious figures throughout the 
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communist period, the following chapters will explain how Catholicism was able to maintain a 
strong loyalty among believers, and ultimately outlast the communist regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Chapter I: The Roman Catholic Church’s Influence in Poland Prior to WWII 
I. Foundations of the Catholic Church in Poland 
With a history that has withstood more than one thousand years of “kingdoms, dynasties, 
republics, parties, and regimes,” the ongoing presence of the Roman Catholic Church remains 
one of the “very few threads of continuity in Poland‟s past.”5 The origins of Polish Catholicism 
date back to 966 A.D. under Mieszko I.
6
 At a time when Poland was nothing more than a 
collection of principalities, the Catholic Church served as one of its original and predominant 
unifying forces. This is not to say that Catholicism was immediately well received in Polish 
lands; paganism was still influential among many people. However, over the next few centuries, 
Catholicism acted as an institution of spiritual support and leadership. 
This was especially true during the reign of King Kaszimierz the Great, whose time in 
power transformed Kraków “from a wooden town into a city of brick and stone.”7 Among a 
variety of other accomplishments, Kaszimierz the Great became famous for creating the 
Jagiellonian University in Kraków, the second oldest university in Central Europe. During this 
time, the establishment of a university warranted permission from the Pope. Not only did the 
Pope‟s decision determine the mere existence of a university, but he also had the power to deny 
the formation of particular schools. In the case of the StudiumGenerale (currently known as the 
Jagiellonian University), a school of theology, which was considered to be the most prestigious 
of schools, was not originally permitted as a faculty. It was not until the death of Queen Jadwiga 
in 1400 that theology became one of the university‟s four main faculties.8  The Church exhibited 
considerable power in many nations besides Poland; however, Kaszimierz the Great‟s motivation 
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behind the university‟s founding offers insight to the importance of the Catholic Church to Poles. 
In his founding charter, Kaszimierz states his desire for a “greater love of prayer and a more 
effective ordering of the Catholic faith.”9 The infiltration of the Catholic Church into intellectual 
institutions such as the StudiumGenerale demonstrates its overarching cultural significance. In 
addition, the StudiumGenerale eventually became home to a number of Poland‟s most prominent 
and influential intellectuals. So, in a sense, the foundations of Polish intellectualism were placed 
at the discretion of one powerful Pope, and this fact cannot be ignored.  
 More crucial to Kaszimierz‟s legacy was the immense increase in religious tolerance that 
took place. During this time, Poland was not homogenous in ethnic, national, or religious terms. 
This was exhibited by the relatively successful incorporation of the largest Jewish population of 
the period. The integration of a considerable Jewish population would have significant 
implications for Poland‟s future. Yet, for argument‟s sake, it is important to recognize that its 
tolerance of non-Catholic populations focused Poland‟s attention less on religious differences, 
and more on its interests in the mainstream cultural affairs of Western Europe.  While the 
establishment of the Catholic Church certainly provided the Poles a means of association with 
Western Europe, it also created the basis for religious animosity and tension with neighboring 
Orthodox Russia to the east. Unfortunately for Poland, much of this was due to its geographic 
location, which acted as a natural vulnerability, and placed a seemingly unavoidable handicap on 
the nation and its people. Poland became a political, religious, and territorial target of its foreign 
adversaries, and this would contribute to Poland-Lithuania‟s eventual demise. It cannot be 
argued, however, that geographic location was the sole factor involved in the division of Polish-
Lithuanian territory among foreign powers. The heavy influence of the szlachta, the Polish 
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aristocracy, also contributed to the Commonwealth‟s downfall, so this distinction will be 
discussed in further detail in a later section. 
While it would be an exaggeration to claim that Poland‟s ties to Catholicism resulted in 
constant victories in military conflicts, it can be argued that Poland‟s faith in the Catholic Church 
may have contributed to enhanced performance in battle. If nothing else, loyalty to the Church 
during the most trying of times suggests that Polish devotion was of significant importance. This 
was exemplified in the 1410 Battle of Grunwald, when pre-battle rituals exhibited the “fervent 
Catholicism [that] radiate[d] from the earliest known composition in the Polish language.”10 
During the Jagiellonian period, Bogurodzica, “Mother of God,” was commonly sung by knights 
in the Polish-Lithuanian Army prior to battle.  The song illustrates Poles‟ attempts to gain 
protection from Mary, as they asked her to “assist [them]” in their forthcoming battle.11 Perhaps 
this is nothing more than a final effort to seek guidance from an all-powerful entity; however, 
considering Poland‟s history, this could very well act as evidence to support the developing 
influence of the Church in the lives of Poles. The central Catholic teachings offered an 
impression of stability to Poles who lived through constant political and territorial volatility. In 
addition, this profession of faith during a period of defense contributes to the early stages of the 
relationship between Polish Catholicism and a sense of nationalism.  
II. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth emerged as a powerful European political force in 
1385. Due to a lack of a rightful heir to the Polish throne, Jagiełło of Lithuania agreed to take 
Jadwiga of Poland‟s hand in marriage. This was not, however, without concessions. Among 
other things, Jagiełło agreed to officially convert the pagan beliefs of his people to those of 
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Roman Catholicism.
12
 Not only did this personal union increase the number of Catholics residing 
within Polish territory, but it also expanded Polish influence farther east. This would eventually 
lead to aggravated tensions between Poles and Russians, who participated in an ongoing struggle 
for religious and political dominance. If Jagiełło never agreed to the conditions of the marriage, 
the Commonwealth may never have existed, resulting in a lost opportunity for expansion, and 
forever changing the course of Catholicism‟s influence on Polish history. 
The Commonwealth‟s potential for expansion grew drastically as a result of the 
incorporation of Lithuania. This union burgeoned as a powerful political and economic force 
within the confines of Europe. Because of this vast expansion, Poland-Lithuania adopted policies 
of religious toleration. The Commonwealth grew and incorporated more ethnically and 
religiously diverse populations, so it was only practical to allow for the toleration of people with 
many different religious affiliations. This portion of Jagiellonian rule is often referred to as the 
“Golden Age” of Poland.13 This “Golden Age” was influenced by the events of the Renaissance, 
which contributed to a prospering cultural life in Poland-Lithuania. Polish participation in the 
Renaissance is not frequently recognized; a number of Europeans were hesitant to acknowledge 
Poland‟s progression to modernity. This is demonstrated through Erasmus of Rotterdam‟s 
“praise” for Poland‟s emergence into the Renaissance period by “congratulat[ing] a people who, 
though formerly ill regarded as barbarian, now so blossoms in letters, laws, customs, religion, 
and in whatever else may spare it the reproach of uncouthness…”14   In reality, Poland-
Lithuania‟s exposure to Renaissance culture was greater than any other state in Eastern Europe. 
The expansion of territory, along with the Commonwealth‟s religious ties to Rome, gave Poles 
reason to involve themselves with Renaissance ideas.  
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As a result of the Renaissance, Polish intellectuals became well acquainted with the 
ideals of humanism, a philosophy that stresses the inherent value of man‟s ability to use reason 
as a means to reach one‟s full potential. The origins of this movement in Polish history are 
difficult to pinpoint; however, it is likely that Polish involvement in various church councils in 
the early fifteenth century, such as the Council of Basel, laid the foundation for humanism in 
Poland.
15
 Humanist ideals caused religious and intellectual elites to place medieval values under 
“philosophical and scientific speculation.”16  While Polish Church officials developed a deeper 
appreciation for humanism, so did members of the academic elite at the Jagiellonian University 
in Kraków. Lectures began to incorporate humanist values, thus, influencing the perspectives of 
students and spreading the philosophy to a wider audience. This movement was essentially 
Church driven, and led to the emergence of a range of intellectual and scientific developments. 
Church involvement in the movement simply shows the Church‟s ability to align Polish culture 
more directly with western European culture, allowing for a more rapid route toward 
modernization. It is important to note that the ideals of humanism were not limited to the 
Renaissance period. Rather, they would become critical to 20
th
 century Polish history, as Pope 
John Paul II emphasized the importance of treating all men, even adversaries, as fellow humans. 
His respect for the human ability to reason was key in the formation and evolution of Solidarity, 
a non-violent resistance movement meant to undermine the communist regime. In all, it is clear 
that humanism plays a recurring role in Polish history, and contributed to some of the country‟s 
most momentous events. 
A number of Poles participated in and contributed to the Renaissance and the 
implementation of humanist philosophy, but Poland was home to two especially influential 
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figures of the movement—Nicholas Copernicus and Nicholas Hussowczyk. These men stand out 
as intellectuals who made a significant impact on the Renaissance period and the centuries that 
followed. By incorporating popular Renaissance humanist values into their works, Copernicus 
and Hussowczyk were able to express the state of Poland‟s cultural and intellectual progression. 
In the case of Copernicus, a well-known humanist, the content of his theory sparked deep 
controversy among a number of religious officials (Catholic and Protestant). However, officials 
recognized the connections between his religious beliefs and his scientific research,assuring them 
of his personal loyalties to the Church. His work, On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres, which 
explains Copernicus‟ reasoning for his heliocentric theory, also incorporates his allegiance to the 
Church. Not only is the work dedicated to Pope Paul III, but it also makes reference to God, 
whose “grace” motivated and allowed Copernicus to develop his findings.17 During an era when 
Church opposition could seriously jeopardize the ability to have a work published, Copernicus‟ 
recognition of the Church‟s influence on his life spared him opposition from Church officials; his 
work was published, and it revolutionized scientific research.  The Catholic Church‟s 
involvement in and perceived openness to the scientific ideas and progressions of the 
Renaissance period simply demonstrates the overarching influence of the church upon Poles in a 
variety of realms.  
Hussowczyk‟s writing, in particular, articulates his own convictions that were heavily 
influenced by Roman Catholicism. In Poem about the Size, Strength, and Hunting of the Bison, 
Hussowczyk integrates his love for God and Catholicism into a critique of current political and 
religious troubles. More specifically, the poem illustrates Hussowczyk‟s personal aversion to the 
military conflicts between Poland-Lithuania and its enemies, the Turks, the Tatars, and the 
Teutonic Knights. Hussowczyk expresses his admiration of Mary as he asks her to “look upon 
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the madness of wars and fields soaked by blood, see how greatly fate permits the sword to be 
used against a people who united by the covenant of your son deserves to live in brotherly 
peace.”18 Essentially, Hussowczyk‟s opposition to war reflects the impact his faith had on his 
perception of political and territorial conflicts. This excerpt demonstrates his belief that war is 
not only unnecessary and immoral, but to participate in war exhibits a person‟s disregard for the 
value that the Catholic Church places on human life.  Hussowczyk‟s poem acts as a medium 
through which to express his deep faithfulness to the Church. In addition, it sheds light on 
Poland‟s role as the “bulwark of Christendom” during a time when all of Catholic Europe was 
under threat.
19
 It is also important to note the significance behind Hussowczyk‟s asking for 
guidance from Mary. This act exemplifies the deeply-rooted belief among Poles that Mary, the 
Mother of God, makes special efforts to protect the people of Poland. As all of this evidence 
shows, the expression of religious beliefs in response to political unrest signified the deep 
interconnection between religion and nationalism in Poland, even during the Renaissance period.  
The connections between Roman Catholicism and Polish nationalism can also be viewed 
in terms of the period‟s political developments. Not only did the Church present Poles with a 
sense of spiritual strength, but it also provided the Commonwealth with a number of powerful 
and influential political figures. Men such as Cardinal ZbigniewOleśnicki, Archbishop 
MikołajTrąba, Archbishop Jan Łaski, and Bishop PiotrTomicki are simply a few of many clergy 
members who acquired substantial amounts of political power. At times, these men led the Polish 
delegation at religious councils whose decisions occasionally had political implications. More 
specifically, Archbishop MikołajTrąba was head representative of Poland at the Council of 
Constance in 1415 at which, among various other religious issues, the subject of war between 
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Poland and the Teutonic Order was discussed and ruled upon. This demonstrates that in addition 
to the clergy‟s religious significance, the decisions made by these councils held serious political 
implications. In some cases, a member of the clergy would act as an interrex for the ruling king. 
This was especially evident for whoever held the position of Primate of Gniezno. This title was 
given to the standing archbishop of Gniezno, and when a substantial time gap existed between 
the end of one monarch‟s rule and the inauguration of the next, the Primate of Gniezno would 
maintain political control over the Commonwealth.  
On a number of occasions, members of the clergy were considered to be part of the 
Polish nobility, called the szlachta. Membership in the szlachta“was not characterized by socio-
economic criteria, but by its corporate privileges and obligations, and by the body or law and 
tradition which controlled them.”20Significant wealth was not the only indicator of membership 
in the szlachta, and a Pole‟s social standing alone would sometimes allow him to participate in 
the political sphere of the Commonwealth.  This will become especially important during the 
discussion of the downfall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; however, for now, it is 
simply important to understand that members of the Polish nobility had the right to vote, a right 
that the peasantry was not afforded. This, in turn, gave the szlachtainfluence over the decisions 
and policies of the government.  
In relation to the Catholic Church, members of the clergy occasionally ranked high in the 
szlachta, which “on appointment,” allowed them to “[step] into fortunes which had been growing 
ever since the foundation of the Church in AD 1000.”21  In addition to the accumulation of 
substantial fortunes and vast amounts of land, a number of Church officials held positions of 
abundant political power. This is especially evident in the case of Bishop ZbigniewOleśnicki of 
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Kraków, whose long-term service allowed him to become one of the most influential clergymen 
in the Commonwealth. During the course of Oleśnicki‟s career, he served as royal secretary 
under King Władisław II Jagiełło, and his prestige increased in 1439, when he became the first 
native Polish Cardinal. His influence peaked in the mid-15
th
 century, when the Cardinal served 
as the highest ranking official during the reign of Władisław III Jagiełło. He was responsible for 
“day-to-day business,” and was essentially given full control of the Commonwealth.22 The 
appointment of a Catholic official into a position of such considerable power merely emphasizes 
not only the religious role of the Catholic Church in Poland, but also the impact that the Church 
had in Poland-Lithuania‟s political sphere. The ability of Church officials to make religious and 
political matters intersect highlights the true range of the Church‟s overall influence, and 
contributes to its ability to instill a sense of religious loyalty that underlies nationalistic 
sentiments.   
In addition to numerous Bishops and Cardinals who served in positions of sizeable 
political authority, the Jesuits made their mark on Polish-Lithuanian history, especially during 
the Counter-Reformation of the 16
th
 century. During this time, the principles associated with the 
Protestant Reformation were sweeping their way across Europe. While they certainly surfaced 
and influenced a considerable portion of the Polish population, the Commonwealth led its people 
down a contrasting religious path from that of many other European countries. The Jesuits‟ 
emergence in Poland in 1565 was partially responsible for Poland‟s minimal participation in the 
Reformation. In an attempt to curb the Reformation‟s influence on Polish-Lithuanian society, the 
Vatican sent the Jesuits into the Commonwealth with the hopes of reinforcing Poland-
Lithuania‟s role as the Catholic stronghold in Europe. With this goal in mind, the Jesuits were 
able to enforce harsh policies that brought a “black wave of repression, intolerance, and 
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obscurantism” upon the Polish people. 23 Poles were made to believe that any person who 
displayed even minute skepticism and resistance of the Church and papal supremacy was under 
the influence of the “anti-Christ.”24 Thus, it can be argued that the Jesuit order is partially 
responsible for the reinforcement of anti-Jewish sentiment in Poland. In a commonwealth whose 
history, up to this point, attests to a general tolerance of religious views and practices that 
dissented from those of the Catholic Church, it is surprising to learn that representatives of the 
Vatican implemented such extreme and critical views of other religious beliefs. However, given 
the historical context, the Church found its strong presence necessary to the successful outcome 
of the Counter-Reformation in Poland. In cases of growing religious tension and hostility, the 
Jesuit order, official representatives of the Catholic Church, negatively impacted Polish-
Lithuanian society. The Jesuits encouraged religious animosity, and played a role in supporting 
Anti-Semitic beliefs throughout the Commonwealth. Their actions provide an instance when the 
Church impacted society negatively, and through its reinforcement of Anti-Semitic views, may 
have contributed to refuting Jewish identity with Polish nationality.  
  While it is true that the Jesuits were responsible for acts that reflect poorly on Polish 
history, their influence on intellectual development in Poland cannot be ignored. The Jesuit order 
is especially known for its establishment of various intellectual institutions within Poland, which 
totaled 47 by the year 1642.
25
 The prestige of these institutions allowed the Jesuits to incorporate 
religious teachings into their curriculum. The link between Catholicism and education, thus, 
reinforced the influence of the Church on everyday life. It is true that access to education was 
limited to those of economic and social privilege, so the Jesuits‟ influence was isolated from the 
majority of the population. However, it is essential to understand that a concentration on 
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Catholicism through the education of Poland‟s social elites, who were thought to be potential 
future leaders, increased the likelihood of a continuation of the Church‟s influence in Polish-
Lithuanian life. 
Previous points have made the presence of the Catholic Church in Polish political and 
intellectual life very clear. However, it is equally as crucial to demonstrate the spiritual hold that 
the Catholic Church had on Poles during this time. The circumstances under which Poles latched 
onto their Catholic loyalties are particularly interesting, especially when these situations involved 
war and civil unrest. At times, this was the context upon which religious pilgrimage occurred. 
The origins of the seventeenth century miracle of the Black Madonna at JasnaGóra in 
Częstohowa, in particular, exemplify the influence that Catholic loyalties had over the Polish 
people during times of war. The Black Madonna has a rich and complex history, but for the 
purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to pinpoint this seventeenth century miracle. Poland was 
involved in a territorial war with Sweden, and in 1655, Poles found themselves to be 
outnumbered by their Swedish adversaries. Not only were Swedish military forces significantly 
larger, but they were also regarded as some of the strongest in the world.
26
 There was no 
question that Polish military forces were inadequate in such a battle; however, by what Poles 
considered to be a Marian intervention, Polish military forces were able to fight off the strength 
of the Swedish army.  
This is only one of many miracles said to be performed by the Black Madonna, and these 
miracles have led to a constant pilgrimage of Poles to Częstohowa. This will be especially 
important when considering the future discussion of the three hundredth anniversary of the 
pilgrimage to Częstohowa during the communist regime, but for now, it is simply important to 
recognize the profound influence of the Black Madonna on Polish Catholic loyalties. Not only 
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does pilgrimage exhibit one of the deepest expressions of faith, but in the case of the 1656 battle 
against Sweden, Poles cherished Częstohowa not because it was a site of “events of a holy life 
nor a holy body,” but instead, because of the spiritual value of an icon that was “no more and no 
less than an image.”27 This idea makes it even more astonishing to comprehend how Poles could 
place so much of their faith in something as simple as a picture. However, historical and 
contextual evidence of Poles‟ devotion to the Church makes such a belief considerably more 
plausible. Poles‟ attribution of an incredible military victory not to sheer luck or to worthwhile 
preparations, but to the divine intervention of Mary in the Black Madonna icon demonstrates 
their deeply rooted relationship with the Church. The connections between religious devotion 
and nationalism are also evident in this example. To win a war against a foreign enemy sparks a 
sense of nationalism, regardless of the religious affiliations of the nation‟s people. However, for 
the Poles to credit the image of the Black Madonna with the miraculous military victory at 
Częstohowa very clearly demonstrates how tightly intertwined sentiments of nationalism and 
Catholicism were and continue to be in Poland.  
The Downfall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: 
 At its prime, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a major political force in Eastern 
Europe; it threatened the political and religious autonomy of its neighbors for centuries. From the 
onset of the Commonwealth‟s existence to its final days, Poland-Lithuania‟s people made 
substantial progress on the path toward modernization. Poland-Lithuania‟s involvement in the 
Renaissance especially provided its people with exposure to more Western intellectual 
philosophies. On top of a number of military conflicts that weakened the general position of the 
Commonwealth in relation to foreign affairs, Poland-Lithuania faced internal issues that 
contributed to its demise. The strength of the Commonwealth could not be sustained forever, 
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especially with the antiquated legislative and socio-economic structures in place.  As previously 
stated, the szlachta contributed heavily to the decline of the Commonwealth; its inefficient 
legislative procedures and strong desire to maintain as much power as possible led to a 
stagnation in the process of legislative modernization. Andres Kasekamp explains that, “while 
neighbouring states were centralising authority in the hands of the monarch, the multitudinous 
Polish-Lithuanian nobility zealously guarded its „golden liberties.‟”28 The Liberum Veto is a 
prime example of the misguided policies of the Sejm, the Commonwealth‟s Parliament. Under 
the stipulations of the Liberum Veto, a member of Parliament could express feelings of 
displeasure with a proceeding, and this would freeze the legislative process. While the rationale 
behind the veto is honorable,—the Commonwealth wanted a method that would check the 
“absolutist designs of the Polish monarchy”—in practice, this policy only contributed to the 
discontinuities of an already fragmented legislative system.
29
 
Yet another setback for the Commonwealth was the overwhelming social power of the 
szlachta. The Polish-Lithuanian nobility comprised a larger percentage of the Polish population 
than any other country in Europe. This posed an issue when considering the maintenance of 
power. At times, people whose power is threatened and who wish to remain in positions of 
political and social authority will approve policies that work in their favor, in turn, 
disenfranchising the lower classes. The ruling classes‟ policies made social mobility difficult, 
resulting in the continued marginalization of the lower classes, relative to members of the 
szlachta. With that said, the gap that existed between the everyday grievances of peasantry and 
the szlachtaprovided intensity in lower class loyalties to the Catholic Church. In contrast with the 
seemingly large-scaleconcerns of the szlachta, the lives of peasants were associated much more 
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closely to everyday survival. Because of this, the peasants felt a strong connection to the Church 
and Mary, who provided them with a sense of hope—hope that the conditions upon which their 
lives were centered would one day improve.
30
 Unlike the szlachta, the peasantry‟s limited access 
to education made their motivations behind Church loyalty simple; when there is little in life to 
look forward to, it makes sense to put faith into a higher power. This devotion to the Catholic 
Church did not die out in the coming centuries. Although Poland-Lithuania was partitioned 
beginning in 1772 and ending in 1795, the loyalties to the Church remained. Poland did not exist 
as a state for more than a century, but this did not diminish the nationalistic and religious values 
of the Polish people.   
III. The Partition Period 
 As previously stated, the instability and inefficiency of the Polish-Lithuanian gentry state 
was not sustainable, resulting in sizable deficiencies that were difficult to compensate.  Because 
of this, Poland experienced its initial partition in 1772 when Russian Tsarina Catherine the Great 
recognized and took advantage of Polish weakness. Russia was always interested in an 
opportunity to dominate Eastern Europe, and Poland acted as a natural buffer for Russian 
expansion. Catherine‟s acknowledgment of Poland‟s weakened state allowed her to strategize 
about actualizing a long-lasting Russian desire for domination, resulting in the initiation of the 
partition period. Following the first partition, the Polish Sejm remained in session for four years 
in an attempt to reconstruct its failing state. Reforms including the establishment of a 
Constitution and changes to the educational system were instituted; however, these were not 
enough to save an already crumbling state. Poland underwent a partition once again in 1793, 
leaving some Poles under Russian and others under Prussian rule. The last partition took place in 
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1795, finalizing the tally of partitioning powers at three, with the Hapsburg Empire taking 
control of the southern portion of the former Commonwealth.  
The partition period proved to be one of great difficulty for Poles, who often referred to 
Poland as the “Christ of Nations” which would be resurrected after what they believed was a 
period of “Babylonian Captivity;” they were persecuted and felt the true pressures and hardships 
of living under a foreign ruling power. The partitions impacted the szlachtamost because they 
were forced to choose their fate; they could resist foreign power and fight for Polish 
independence, emigrate from Poland, or abandon their Polish identity and collaborate with the 
ruling powers. While some Poles ultimately decided to collaborate, this did not change the fact 
that identity continued to be of primary importance to the majority of Poles. The partition period 
is one of the darkest in Polish history; however, “Poland fell, not at the moment of her deepest 
degradation, but just when she was beginning to put forth new life and to show her greatest 
patriotism and energy.”31 As is evident through the development of a number of political and 
social reforms prior to the final partition, Poles recognized their faults and were at the cusp of 
altering their deficiencies. While there was not enough time for Poles to fully and successfully 
reform before the last partition, the fact that national morale was one of optimism allowed them 
to fight through the tough partition years that followed. As was true in previous centuries, Polish 
Catholic allegiance did not deviate from its original strength during the partition period. Their 
religious convictions allowed Poles to feel a sense of community and protection through their 
numerous attempts at winning back their sovereignty. 
The Russian Partition: 
There is no doubt that Poles living under Russian rule during the partition period faced 
decades of oppression. While it is true that the intensity of oppressive measures fluctuated with 
                                                          
31
 Lord, “Conclusion,” pg. 491 
19 
 
the change of Russian tsars, Poles continually found their identity threatened by dominant 
Russian political, religious, and cultural policies. Polish hostility towards Russians was not, 
however, simply due to the fact that Poles were placed under harsh Russian rule. Rather, tension 
between Russians and Poles dates back centuries, and is heavily rooted in diverging religious and 
nationalistic beliefs. This “bipolar” relationship originated in the initial schism of the Eastern and 
Western churches.
32
 Russians strongly believed that adherents to Eastern Orthodoxy were 
superior to those whose beliefs differed. This was because Russians saw themselves as 
supporters on the “correct side of the doctrinal schism between Eastern and Western churches, 
and that [Orthodoxy was] the lawful successor church to the Eastern Slavs residing in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth.”33 In contrast to Western followers, Russians were confident in the 
conviction that they were loyal to the “pure” faith.34 In addition, centuries of minimal contact 
with the Western Church created a misunderstanding of Western beliefs among Orthodox 
Church officials, and only led to a strengthened distrust of Western culture. This sense of 
superiority and suspicion was especially evident following the Union of Brest in 1596. The 
Union established unprecedented Orthodox acceptance of papal authority among portions of the 
Belarusian and Ukrainian populations, creating the Uniate Church. Russians considered the 
acceptance of papal supremacy to be the result of Polish Catholic influence which, “intentionally 
led the Belarusian and Ukrainian people from the path of „true‟ faith and into „Roman heresy.‟”35 
This eventually contributed to the causes of the Cossack revolt against the Commonwealth in 
1648 that was a culmination of religious and political resentment towards the Poles who were in 
control of Ukrainian territory. In all, the Cossack attack on the Commonwealth increased Polish 
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Catholic convictions, and increased Cossack loyalty to the Russian tsar, which would have a 
considerable impact on Russian history in years to come.  
In addition to the belief that Poles deliberately coerced people to accept papal supremacy, 
Russians felt a sense of ethnic superiority directly associated with their religious loyalties. 
Orthodoxy was synonymous with identification as an Eastern Slav. However, when Belarusians 
and Ukrainians converted from Orthodoxy and became Uniates, Russians saw this as an “assault 
on Russian cultural leadership in the Eastern Slavic world.”36 Since Belarusians and Ukrainians 
are ethnically Eastern, not Western Slavs, Russians saw their religious conversion as a reflection 
on efforts of strategic Polonization. For these reasons, Russian authority as a partition power in 
Poland was strict and not openly accepted by Poles. However, despite the limited autonomy 
Poles received under Russian occupation, the strength of Polish nationalistic and religious 
faithfulness was not entirely diminished.  
In response to continual efforts to control every aspect of their lives, Poles banded 
together in revolution to express their interests as a people. This was exemplified during the 
revolutions of 1830 and 1863, which were substantial efforts aimed at demonstrating Poles‟ 
unwillingness to comply with harsh Russian policies. Prior to the uprising in 1830, Poles were 
afforded a substantial amount of autonomy, and did not experience serious violations of their 
rights. The Polish portion of Russia was called the Congress Kingdom, and Poles were held to 
relatively loose standards. However, following the 1830 uprising, Russian authorities placed 
much tighter restrictions on Poles, intensifying the already unstable relationship between Poles 
and Russians. Poles were discouraged by the aftermath of the 1830 uprising, which is depicted in 
Dziady, one of Adam Mickiewicz‟s most famous works. The poem equates the Polish experience 
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in the partition period with the sufferings of Christ.
37
 Mickiewicz‟s connection demonstrates the 
fact that many Poles rationalized a number of their national hardships by comparing them to 
times of great religious suffering.   
It was not until the revolution of 1863 that the Congress Kingdom was fully abolished 
and incorporated into the Russian Empire. As a result, Poles were subjected to even more severe 
methods of Russification. This was especially true during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I. As tsar, 
Nicholas established what is known as the Russian troika, which constituted what he believed to 
be the three most important principles in Russian society: Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and 
Nationality. This meant that any challenge to Russian authority in any of the three spheres was 
not permissible. Since Poland was incorporated into the Russian Empire, Poles were also 
expected to abide by these principles.  
Under Russian rule, “religious dissent was equated with treason,” and “speak[ing] a 
foreign language or promot[ing] a culture other than Russian, was to be unpatriotic and 
politically disloyal.”38 Russian authorities were so extreme in their methods that even the Polish 
language was considered foreign and was taught to Polish children in Russian.
39
 Maria 
Skłodowska, more commonly known as Madame Curie, described her experience attending 
school under Russian control in Warsaw, explaining that, “One of the subtlest humiliations the 
Tsar had discovered was to make the Polish children say their Catholic prayers every day in 
Russian…”40 Not only was this an insult to the Polish ethnic identity, but it also demonstrated 
Russian efforts to demoralize Polish sentiments toward the Catholic Church.  
                                                          
37Liukonnen, “Adam Mickiewicz,” 15 November 2012 
38
 Davies, “Rossiya: The Russian Partition,” pg. 89-90  
39
 Ibid., pg. 100 
40
 Ibid., pg. 101 
22 
 
In addition to the penetration of Russification in schools, Russian authorities made their 
distaste for the Catholic Church evident through a number of religiously centered political 
policies. First, access to Rome was essentially cut off. Polish dioceses were split from their 
original form, and their leaders were forced to report to the Russian Archbishop in Mogilev. 
Approximately half of Polish convents were closed, and Church property was confiscated. Strict 
surveillance of church officials was commonplace, and “all sermons, pronouncements, and 
religious publications were to be inspected by the Tsarist police.”41 Incidents such as these were 
far from unusual, and created great internal distress for Poles, whose religious beliefs and 
national consciousness were at the core of their identity. As previously stated, the Poles‟ 
misfortune during the partition period was exacerbated by the inaction of the Vatican. Instead of 
defending Polish interests, leaders in Rome “saw no reason why the Church should intervene too 
energetically with the Powers on the Poles‟ behalf.”42 Since the ruling powers held an official 
stance of religious tolerance, Church leaders refused to recognize the disenfranchisement taking 
place in spite of the official policies. With limited support from the highest of Church officials, 
Poles had no choice but to maintain their loyalty to the Catholic Church in order to demonstrate 
that “their form of Catholicism was more Catholic than the Pope.”43 Despite feelings of 
abandonment and discouragement, Poles upheld their devotion to the Church. Especially under 
Russian rule, the Church became a symbol not only of Polish religious convictions, but also of 
Polish national identity. Since religion was so heavily associated with national consciousness, it 
only made sense to remain loyal to the institution that was experiencing a substantial amount of 
persecution. Poles felt that an attack on the Church, a long-standing marker of Polish cultural 
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heritage, was an attack on Polish national identity, so their traditional role as the defenders of 
Catholicism lived on.   
The Prussian Partition: 
Prussia no longer exists as a political and territorial entity; however, it was once a 
thriving state that had a high-caliber military whose skill was difficult to surpass. Prussia 
participated in the partitioning of Poland, and ruled over a portion of the Polish population in 
Silesia, Pomerania, and Poznań for over a century. There is no doubt that people who lived under 
Prussian rule were required to abide by strict authoritarian law, which “operated on the principle 
that the will of the ruler and of his government was supreme.”44  Certainly there are parallels 
between Russian and Prussian attitudes of rule, but their principles were not entirely the same. 
While life under Prussian rule was monitored and regulated by the authorities, it was not quite as 
harsh as life under Russian rule. This was especially true when considering religious principles. 
The attitudes of most of 19
th
 century Prussia reflected a general tolerance of Polish Catholicism. 
Religious conformity was not a prerequisite for individual social or political advancement.
45
 
However, this tolerance would not be sustained throughout all of the 19
th
 century.   
With the creation of the Second Reich in 1871, Polish territories under Prussian rule were 
officially incorporated into the German empire. This was followed by the Germanization and 
elimination of cultural sovereignty of the Polish minorities in the empire through Otto von 
Bismarck‟s strict policy of Kulturkampf. Bismarck looked down on the Poles whose republic, he 
believed, “owed its destruction much less to foreigners than to the inconceivable worthlessness 
of those persons who represented the Polish nation when it was broken up.”46Considering 
Bismarck‟s opinions of the Polish people, it is no surprise that he made a concerted effort to 
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suppress almost anything representative of the Polish identity. Prussian men, for example, were 
forbidden to marry Polish women, as it was believed that culture was passed down to future 
generations through the mother.
47
 Since Catholicism was so closely associated with the Polish 
identity, the stipulations of Kulturkampfwere very clearly intended to weaken the role of the 
Church. The Polish language, therefore, was no longer permitted as the primary language of 
educational or religious instruction, and priests were obligated to pass a German culture exam.
48
 
In addition, Prussian authorities insisted on the closing of Poznań‟s seminary and the school of 
the Sisters of the Sacred Heart and of the Ursulines in Poznań and Gniezno.49 Priests were 
harassed and were sometimes even imprisoned for their resistance.  
Bismarck‟s Kulturkampf focused on modernizing Poland by ridding its people of the 
“intangible” cultural influences of language, literature, theater, and most notably, Catholicism.50 
However, to Bismarck‟s dismay, his policies had an adverse effect that weakened assimilation 
efforts and reinforced traditional cultural influence among Poles. Acting as a primary source of 
cultural identity, the Catholic Church received steady support from its followers and was 
“converted… into a symbol of national resistance.”51 Just as Polish Catholicism could not be 
entirely shaken by Russian oppressive measures, the Church enjoyed significant support from 
Polish minorities in Prussia. So, the Church remained a common unifying force among Poles 
who were politically and geographically separated by the partitioning powers.  
The Austrian Partition: 
The Hapsburg Empire extended its territory as the final partitioning power of Poland. It 
controlled Galicia and Lodomeria, which included the present-day Polish region of 
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Małopolskieand portions of present-day Ukraine. Relative to the Russian and Prussian empires, 
the Austrian empire during the partition period was considered weak in its administration of 
policies toward the Poles. This is not to say that life in Austrian territory was easy; the empire‟s 
officials certainly interfered in political and social spheres of everyday life. For one, Poles were 
encouraged to maintain their religious beliefs in the form of the Marian Cult, but they were 
“instructed to redirect their prayers from „the Virgin Mary, Queen of Poland‟ to „the Virgin 
Mary, Queen of Galicia and Lodomeria‟.”52Racism was also a pervasive issue in an empire 
whose population was a conglomeration of nationalities. In addition, taxation was high in 
comparison to former Polish rates, and the bureaucratic system was large, powerful, and 
“notoriously formal.”53 
However, in contrast to the policies in the Russian and Prussian partitions, the oppression 
that Poles faced under Austrian rule was more closely a result of the political instability of the 
empire as opposed to a purely intentional form of oppression. R.F. Leslie illustrates the life of a 
Galician peasant as one filled with “indebtedness, land hunger, illiteracy, and backwardness.”54 
A typical Galacian “ate less than one-half of the standard English diet…yet he paid twice as high 
a proportion of his income in taxes.”55 All of this backwardness had serious implications for the 
empire whose ineptitude led to a lack of stability, and in turn, significant emigration from Galicia 
and Lodomeria.  
Davies offers a concise description of Austrian weakness: “there was little of the 
earnestness and dynamism of Prussia, and none of the ambition of Russia.”56 Austria lacked the 
strength to enforce “cultural imperialism” to the degree of its fellow partitioning powers, and this 
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allowed Poles to maintain and develop their cultural ideals with little interference from Austrian 
authorities. The same could be said for religious freedom in Galicia; minimal intervention from 
Austrian officials gave Poles great freedom relative to Poles in the other partitions. The 
preservation of the bond between Polishness and Catholicism lived on, providing Poles in the 
Austrian partition with a consistent distinguishable marker of their nationality at a time when 
their official identity was erased from the map. 
Development of the Polish Proletariat: 
The Industrial Revolution surfaced in Poland at the end of the 19
th
 century, and laid the 
foundation for the Polish socialist movement. It is essential to unravel the central components of 
Marxism in order to understand the influence of the socialist movement on Polish identity and 
Polish Catholicism. The ideals that drive Marxism eventually became problematic for Catholic 
Poland, but for now, it is simply important to understand its foundation. Marxism is a 
materialistic and historically based ideology that centers itself on the belief that all workings of 
society are class-based and are the result of capitalist exploitation. In other words, there is an 
ongoing struggle between the owners of the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and those 
who work to produce the goods (the proletariat). Marx believed that continual exploitation of the 
proletariat by the bourgeoisie would lead to a socialist revolution in which society would 
ultimately rid itself of capitalism and develop a classless utopia. 
 Marxism is not simply a theory; it is a way of life. Its ideology addresses all aspects of 
everyday life, including religion. This ideology targets many religions, but the reference to 
religion in this context will be synonymous with Catholicism. Marxists describe religion as the 
“opiate of the masses.” Not only is the existence of an omnipotent God impossible to prove, but 
religion teaches followers to accept the fact that there is no true reason for why bad things 
27 
 
happen to good people. Religion urges people to trust God‟s will and to have faith that the dead 
who were righteous in life are rewarded through everlasting life in heaven. In addition, when 
monotheistic religions are not in conflict with one another, they promote brotherhood and 
sisterhood; followers are told to treat other believers of monotheistic religions with respect since 
they are all descendants of Adam and Eve. Conversely, Marxists do not see religion as a unifying 
force. Instead, they insist that religion is simply a tool used to deflect attention away from the 
exploitative measures used by capitalists against the proletariat. This is why religion is an opiate; 
it causes the exploited to be distracted from the true divisions among members of society. 
Considering Poland‟s long-term history of religious devotion, it is no surprise that the religious 
ideals of Marxism would automatically create relative hostility towards socialism among the 
Polish population.  
Increasing industrialization in Poland was followed by the development of the Polish 
proletariat, some of whom were absorbed by the Polish socialist movement. As the partition 
period lived on, Poles became divided in their nationalistic aspirations. Some fought in support 
of Roman Dmowski, who led the nationalist movement.  Dmowski was critical of the traditional 
Polish nationalism and tolerance that emerged during the peak of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. He and “the parties of the Right and Center interpreted Polish history as 
validating their preference for an ethnically and religiously homogenous modern society with a 
centralistic state apparatus.”57 He wanted Poles to let go of their desire for an independent 
Poland, and urged them to focus on creating a “separate and autonomous Poland.”58Dmowski 
sought to create a Polish nationalism that was no longer relatively tolerant, but purely exclusive, 
and used the strength of Catholicism among Poles to promote his cause. To Dmowski, 
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Catholicism was “declared…to be an attribute of the Polish nation.”59 With this, he hoped to 
transform the Polish national identity from one that included all people who spoke the Polish 
language to one that considered the Polish identity to be directly associated with Polish 
Catholicism. Those who did not meet this criterion were no longer considered Polish, and in 
Dmowski‟s mind, had no right to remain in Polish territory.  
In contrast to Dmowski, Josef Piłsudski led the socialist movement in favor of 
independence. His desire for Polish independence was driven by a hope to unite Poles regardless 
of their religious affiliation. He and his fellow socialists “favoured the concept of a spiritual 
community, united by the bonds of culture and history.”60  Unlike Dmowski and the political 
Right, Piłsudski and his supporters saw Polish history “as a prescription for pluralism and 
federalism.”61 The political Left was determined to recreate an independent Poland on the basis 
of Polish ideals, so religious identity was not a prerequisite for inclusion in Polish society. While 
Dmowski wanted to keep Poland open for Polish Catholics, Piłsudski favored a Poland that 
exhibited tolerance for anyone who considered himself Polish.  
The fact that religion was so heavily weighted in the formation of these ideologies 
demonstrates the depth by which Poles consider their ties to the Catholic Church. These 
differences in ideology soon influenced the establishment of the Polish state following the First 
World War. Piłsudski hoped to continue the Polish-Lithuanian legacy of relative tolerance 
toward different religions to demonstrate that the Polish identity was not rooted solely in 
Catholic loyalty, but also encompassed the Polish language, culture, and history.  On the other 
hand, Dmowski wanted to change what it meant to be Polish. He and his supporters recognized 
the connection between the Polish identity and the Catholic Church and promoted an ideology 
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that established a Poland meant only for what he considered to be real Poles—the Catholics. 
While Catholic intellectuals generally took a “neutral” position in the dispute between 
Nationalists and Socialists, it is evident that both movements launched the Church into its 
position as the “bastion of non-communist culture, and the focus of the loyal opposition.”62 
Summary: 
 The strength and vitality of Polish Catholicism were tested during the partition period. 
There were certainly variations of oppression within each of the partitions, but it is fair to say 
that Polish identity was not officially recognized, nor was it respected. Catholicism was placed 
under tremendous scrutiny, but was able to unify Poles who aspired to one day gain 
independence. Catholicism‟s close connection with the Polish identity allowed for its survival 
through the partition period and eventually proved to be critical to the reestablishment of Polish 
society after the removal of the partitions.  In addition, it is important to recognize the role 
Catholicism played in the formation of Polish socialism since socialist policies would use 
Catholicism in some cases to promote their causes.  
IV. World War I 
 The world was forever changed by World War I, whose causes and outcomes greatly 
contributed to the political, economic, and social catastrophes that define the 20
th
 century. This 
war had a number of results that unfolded throughout the entirety of the century, but in regards to 
Polish Catholicism, it is crucial to pinpoint a few in particular. First, the war brought the partition 
period to a permanent end, and a Polish state was officially recreated; it was the first time in over 
a century that a person could locate Polish borders on a map. In addition, the war was a main 
trigger of the Russian Revolution, whose effects led to the rise and eventual spread of 
communism, and ultimately, strong Soviet influence in Poland.  The religious hostilities so 
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engrained in communist ideology would test the strength of Polish Catholicism for decades to 
come.  
The war also highlighted the Vatican‟s recurring indifference to Polish territorial and 
societal vulnerability. In 1915, “nearly all the Polish territories had fallen into German and 
Austrian hands, and the Vatican showed no signs of unease at this development or its 
implications for the destiny of the Poles.”63 The most apparent explanation for this was the 
Vatican‟s belief that an “Austro-Polish approach” would be advantageous to the Church, as 
Poland would be officially linked with the Catholic Hapsburg monarchy.
64
 It was clear that the 
Vatican‟s concerns were most closely associated with the maintenance of a Catholic stronghold 
in the region; it seems that the Vatican felt a victorious Hapsburg Empire would foster 
Catholicism better than the Poles themselves. Instead of protecting and supporting rising Polish 
aspirations for independence, the highest of Roman Catholic officials were more interested in 
preserving Catholicism in ways they saw fit.
65
 
It was not until the destruction of the German and Austrian partitioning powers that the 
Vatican expressed support for the burgeoning independence of Poland. Its intentions, not 
surprisingly, were clouded by its own agenda. Left in a post-war Europe where the rise of 
Bolshevism and socialism displayed heavy antagonism toward religion, the Church sought 
refuge in what seemed to be the only reliable safe haven of Catholicism—independent Poland. 
The Vatican acknowledged the resurrection of the Polish state, not because it supported Polish 
aspirations for independence or acknowledged the strength of the Polish national identity, but 
because it recognized the Polish ability to serve as a bulwark of Catholicism in the region. Pope 
Benedict XV understood the strength of Polish Catholicism and “trusted that the erection of a 
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Catholic Poland on the western flank of Russia might advance the interests of the faith and serve 
as a partial remedy for the deranged condition of Europe.”66 
The Vatican prioritized the politics of Catholicism over the genuine care for the well-
being of its Polish followers, sacrificing its legitimacy as a supposed promoter of fundamental 
Christian ideals. As a result, “the Vatican‟s apparent indifference could not be easily explained to 
Polish Catholics, many of whom had clung to their faith as a last consolation against alien 
oppression.”67 However, to no credit of its own, the Poles‟ fundamental connections to the 
Church outweighed their skepticism of the Vatican, so the religious loyalties that would be 
crucial during the communist period remained strong. This is why a discussion of the 
consequences of Poland‟s reestablishment and the rise of communist influence is imperative in 
order to address the true purpose of this paper— to explain the reasons why Polish loyalties to 
the Catholic Church were sustained despite the suppressive policies of the communist regime.  
An Independent Poland and the Interwar Period:  
After over a century of partitions, Poland‟s newborn independence was certainly long 
overdue. However, this does not negate the fact that following World War I, the country and its 
people faced challenges that cannot be overlooked. While Poles believed that independence 
would demonstrate their ability and willingness to progress, the state‟s reemergence actually 
“created almost as many problems as it had solved.”68 One of the most pressing issues concerned 
the Polish identity, which did not have official recognition for over a century. At the inception of 
its new independence, Poland had the daunting task of determining how to best incorporate three 
separate identities into one that was cohesive enough to move the country forward. While 
American President Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Pointsand the Treaty of Versailles called for 
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the recreation of an independent Poland, it is clear that this task was not without difficulty. Polish 
independence was paradoxically complicated by what once was considered one of its greatest 
assets: ethnic and religious diversity. Poland was not a homogenous state, and the inclusion of 
“territorial” and “dispersed” minorities, whose religious beliefs generally differed from those of 
the Polish Catholics, posed an issue for a country already struggling to develop a cohesive 
national identity.
69
 
As previously discussed, tensions mounted among political parties whose analysis of 
Polish history led to diverging views about how to move the country forward.   Not surprisingly, 
hostility towards Poland was just as substantial an issue outside Polish territory as it was within 
the borders. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were unacceptable to many bordering 
nations who felt that they were denied land that was rightly theirs, so Poland found itself fighting 
foreign powers in six separate wars between 1918 and 1921.
7071
 Everyday procedures also 
became a great issue in a country whose regions contained “wide divergencies of law and 
custom, of temperament, and even of language.”72  In addition, Poland had to address logistical 
problems since it was without a number of unified systems such as transportation, currency, 
education, and taxes.
73
 These factors, along with a host of others, aggravated the already troubled 
state of affairs in a country whose independence seemed to be in constant jeopardy. 
Despite the Vatican‟s questionable intentions in relation to its support of Polish 
independence, the Catholic Church resurfaced as an institution with considerable strength and 
state support during the interwar period. In contrast to the partition period, the Church was 
recognized as a powerful religious entity that enjoyed relative autonomy. Although Catholicism 
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represented the religious allegiance of slightly more than two-thirds of the Polish population, 
resulting in the denial of the Catholic Church as the “national Established Church,” and “its 
political influence was [initially] restricted by the markedly anticlerical temper of the ruling 
elite,” the Church was still able to re-establish its presence through the 1921 Constitution as well 
as the Concordat of 1925.
74
 
It has already been established that Papal interest in Poland was tied to the Vatican‟s 
recognition of widespread religious vulnerability in the post-war era. However, while this seems 
to be the explanation with the most weight, the influence of Pope Pius XI‟s personal connection 
to Poland in dealing with Polish government leaders cannot be ignored. Pope Pius began his rise 
to the papacy as a nuncio in Poland, which despite his “Polish tribulations,” he grew to love.75 
For Poles under the papacy of Pius XI, “Catholic Poland would enjoy the benefits and bear the 
trials of living with a pope who carried intense memories, good and bad, of the days he had spent 
in the lands of the Vistula.”76 Pius realized that escalating tensions between the Vatican and the 
Polish government would place a damper on plans to solidify Church presence in the region. In 
addition to these reasons, the Polish Constitution of 1921 required the creation of a Concordat, 
which was believed to “provide the basis of the coexistence of church and state.”77 A Concordat 
seemed to be a reasonable way to formally reestablish Church influence. Pius was confident in 
the feasibility of such a plan due to his previous experience in Poland, which made him well 
aware of the complications associated with Polish religious politics.
78
 The stipulations of the 
Concordat were noticeably favorable to the Church; however, this should have seemed perfectly 
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reasonable to the Polish population, since “Church in Polish life existed naturally as a primary 
element and result of national history.”79 
In addition, Polish government officials recognized the depth of Polish loyalties to the 
Church, and simply hoped that a Concordat with the Vatican would be an important step toward 
“achieving the national consolidation [they] sought.”80 However, tensions mounted when the 
Concordat negotiations were continually postponed. The Church feared that slow negotiations 
would coincide with parliamentary elections that had the potential to place more left-leaning 
members in parliament, whose sympathy to the Church was little to none. The Church calmed its 
nerves when the Concordat was officially ratified by President Stanislaw Wojciechowski in 
1925; it essentially gave the Catholic Church autonomy and expanded the scale of official 
Church influence to a level more comparable to that prior to the partitioning period.
81
 The 
Church was allowed a substantial amount of control in religious education, and former church 
property under control of the state was determined to be used for maintaining salaries of the 
clergy.
82
  While opposition to the Concordat was tangible among Catholic priests and bishops 
who feared that the “Church had made needless sacrifices to civil authority and compromised its 
independence from state power,” it was not strong enough to dismantle negotiations.83 
Church relations with the Polish state were heavily dependent on establishing strong 
relationships with the most powerful of Polish statesman. The Church, thus, sought a cooperative 
relationship in one of the most prominent state officials―Piłsudski. His role as Chief of State 
from 1918-1921 and his success in leading the Polish military through the Polish-Soviet War 
gave him great prestige among the Polish population. He resigned from his post as Chief of 
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State, but a coup d‟état in 1926 forced the resignation of President Wojciechowski, as Piłsudski 
became the newest leader of the Polish Second Republic.
84
 Over the next few years, 
Piłsudski‟sgovernment established a delicate, but relatively amicable relationship with the 
Church. Church officials, especially Pope Pius XI, trusted Piłsudski, and accepted the 
consistently stable role of the Church that Piłsudski‟s policies offered.  
This, unfortunately, was slightly dismantled during the aftermath of Piłsudski‟s death in 
1935. “The fragile truce between the Polish Church and the sanacja regime in Warsaw rested so 
heavily on the personal understanding of Piłsudski and the pope,” and Piłsudski‟s death left 
Church and state officials alike unsure of the nature of future Polish Church-state relations. For 
one, the Polish Socialist Party became disjointed by the death of its leader; Piłsudski was the face 
of the party, and “in his absence, it fragmented into factions vying for leadership of the 
movement.”85 To make matters worse, party members found themselves at odds with the Vatican 
when they discovered that Bishop Łosiński of Kielce told officials in his diocese to ignore 
Piłsudski‟s funeral train when it stopped, and he also prohibited   the ringing of church bells in 
Piłsudski‟s honor.86 This and other similar controversies pushed socialist party members to 
suspect that an act of disrespect of this kind was a sign of betrayal, and feared that the Catholic 
Church was throwing its support toward the Right National Democrats, who continually claimed 
to be the Catholic party in Poland.  
The fragile situation was once again threatened by the Wawel incident that caused a 
public uproar when Archbishop Sapieha allowed a personal contempt for Piłsudski to get in the 
way of Piłsudski‟s wish to have his remains buried in the Wawel crypt. Piłsudski‟s final resting 
place was under construction, and Sapieha attempted to sabotage the predetermined plans by 
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issuing an order to have the transfer of Piłsudski‟s body completed within one week, creating an 
unreasonable and impractical deadline.
87Saphiea‟s actions enraged state officials and Polish 
society as a whole, who idolized Piłsudski as a symbol of Polish nationalism. While many 
Church officials rallied in support of Saphiea, the outrage that ensued prompted action from the 
Vatican. An unanticipated, but well-deserved apology was issued from the Vatican, and it was 
rightfully accepted by officials in Warsaw. As Pease suggests, this controversy was the 
embodiment of the struggle between the Church and the Polish state during the interwar period. 
Patriotism had a polarizing effect on Poles whose allegiance was split between two central 
symbols of Polish nationalism. Some Poles “centered on the Church as the age-old guardian and 
definer of national values, [while others were] devoted to the cult of Piłsudski as the exemplar of 
civic virtue, regarding Catholicism as a secondary or even dubious influence.”88 However, it is 
important to note that while tensions between the Church and state were palpable, they did not 
terminate the privileged status of the Church. In addition to the fact that the Catholicism was 
officially considered the primary religion in Poland, the Church continued to have control over 
religious education and press, marriage procedures, hospital administration, and so on. The 
Constitution of 1935 is a prime example of this fact; the state had an opportunity to limit the 
powers of the Church, but instead, Church autonomy was upheld to the same degree it was 
awarded in the 1921 Constitution.  
Summary: 
Pease rightly illustrates the strained relationship between Church and state that resulted in 
conflict among the Polish population, whose loyalties to both the Church and the state were at 
the core of their identity. However, while the interwar period proved to place a strain on Church-
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state relations, it highlighted the extent to which nationalism played a role in defining the Polish 
identity. Differences between Church and state officials certainly became more apparent, but the 
outbreak of the Second World War kept tensions from getting out of hand. Poles soon realized 
the extent to which their country‟s sovereignty was jeopardized by the fascist policies of Hitler‟s 
Germany, and then by the anti-religious communist policies of Stalin‟s Soviet Union. War 
changes everything, and in the case of Poland, its people discounted the Wawel incident and 
other similar examples of Church-state tension in an attempt to latch on to a symbol of 
nationalism that had yet to truly fail them. 
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Chapter II: World War II and the Rise of Communism 
 In order to begin any discussion of the Church‟s position during communism, it is 
imperative, as established in Chapter I, to lay the foundation upon which Church loyalty is based. 
Though they underwent centuries of oppression and civil unrest— from wars against the 
Teutonic Knights and Sweden, the partition period, World War I, and the interwar period — 
Poles developed an unquestionable sense of national identity that is evident to anyone who visits 
Poland up to the present. This national identity is unequivocally associated with the long-lasting 
presence and strength of loyalty to the Catholic Church, which aided Poles in their struggle 
towards sovereignty during times when Poland‟s future was uncertain and under threat. The 
interwar period proved to be one of substantial gain for the Church, whose presence was 
officially recognized and respected by the Polish state. However, this period of relative peace did 
not last long, as the Second World War destroyed the institutions which Poles fought so hard to 
resurrect during the interwar period.  
The conclusion of World War II left Poland in a position that was all too familiar to its 
people: vulnerable to the forces of foreign power and influence. One of the only differences was 
that as a result of World War II and the Holocaust, for the first time in its century-long history, 
the Polish state was ethnically homogenous; Dmowski‟s ideal vision of Poland for the Catholics 
became a harsh reality. As a Soviet satellite state, Poland was once again unable to develop 
policies of its own choosing; instead, policies were enforced by a foreign adversary. 
Communism tested the true strength and vitality of Catholic allegiance in Poland, and in the end, 
Polish Catholicism remained victorious. It is here that a more detailed discussion of Catholicism 
and the crux of this research truly begin. Through a synopsis of the main events pertaining to the 
relationship between the Catholic Church and Polish identity during the rise of communism, this 
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chapter will explain how Catholicism was affected by the religious hostility and oppressive 
policies of the communist regime.  
I. World War II 
 The outbreak of World War II was a culmination of a variety of consequences from the 
previous World War. Poland, more specifically, the Polish corridor and the free city of Gdańsk, 
became territorial hotspots for Hitler, whose policy of self-determination already granted him 
reign over Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939, respectively. Hitler was eager to 
expand the territory of the Third Reich, and knew that invading Poland would only increase the 
likelihood of war in Europe. Hitler blamed a portion of German defeat in World War I on the 
fact that German forces fought a two-front war; he recognized that he needed to devise a scheme 
to ensure that Germany did not repeat the same mistake. So, Hitler initiated a non-aggression 
treaty with Stalin that would allow him to pursue his territorial interests without the risk of 
engaging in a two-front war. The Hitler-Stalin Pact, which secretly granted Stalin the ability to 
create a fourth partition of Poland if the Soviet Union remained neutral upon Hitler‟s offensive 
into Western Poland, made invasion more enticing for both aggressors. Hitler did not have to 
worry about Soviet forces from the East, and Stalin could recover territory lost by the aftermath 
of the previous World War. German forces invaded Polish territory on September 1, 1939, and 
Stalin sent the Red Army to create the fourth partition in Eastern Poland on September 17.  On 
September 28, 1939, not even one month after the initial German invasions, Poland ceased to 
exist. Soviet leaders were satisfied with the news, as Molotov, Soviet Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, exclaimed, “Nothing is left of Poland, this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty.”89 
This was only the beginning of the catastrophic German and Soviet occupations that would 
forever transform the face of post-war Poland.  
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The Vatican’s Position in the Outbreak of War: 
 The Vatican is often criticized for mishandling the Nazis‟ rise to power and eventual 
territorial demands of the Polish Corridor; Rome was “painfully cautious,” and its attempts at 
being a peacemaker failed miserably, as Catholic officials underestimated Hitler‟s plans for the 
region.
90
 In the early 1930s, despite its suspicions of Hitler and the Nazi party, the Vatican tried 
to emphasize the value of the Nazis‟ shared contempt for communism. Even though the Vatican 
was weary of Nazi policies in Europe, it maintained a “prevalent conviction that Communism 
presented the greater long-term threat and that the Nazis, though dangerous, might still be 
persuaded to make useful contributions to the front of opposition to revolution and its Soviet 
sponsors.”91 The Vatican went so far as to sign a Concordat with the German state in 1933, 
hoping that it would provide protection for the Church in Germany.
92
 
 However, after witnessing “flagrant and ongoing violations of the concordat” by the 
Nazi party, Pope Pius XI reprimanded the Nazis for their “ideological offenses against Christian 
morality.”93 Hitler saw the Concordat as a symbol of the Church‟s approval of the Nazi regime, 
leading him to ignore its stipulations and continue on his murderous path toward European 
destruction and eventual German domination.
94As Hitler‟s demands became more direct, the 
Vatican grew concerned about Poland‟s future as the Nazis‟ next target. After a failed attempt at 
convening a peace-bringing conference, Pope Pius XII (Pius XI died in early 1939) urged Poland 
to relinquish Gdańsk in order to appease Hitler, and hopefully, destroy the possibility of war. The 
Polish government, represented by Foreign Minister Józef Beck, refused to listen to the Vatican, 
claiming that Pope Pius‟ tame treatment of Hitler, along with his deeply rooted relationship with 
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German society, was too suspect.
95
 Poland‟s refusal to give up Gdańsk ultimately sparked the 
beginning of World War II.  
In retrospect, the Poles interpret the Vatican‟s participation in the buildup of war as 
weak; they believe that the Pope was “well meaning, but helpless and ineffectual in the end.”96 
Conversely, the Vatican found itself in a difficult position, with vulnerable Catholic populations 
in both Germany and Poland. It tried to maintain peace between Germany and Poland in order to 
avoid a looming catastrophic war, but it is clear that its efforts were negligible. The Vatican held 
out hope that Poland‟s surrender of Gdańsk would put an end to Hitler‟s demands, but this was 
not the case. Hitler‟s plans to repaint the face of Europe were entirely underestimated by the 
Vatican, and no Polish port city would have curbed his hunger for European domination.  
The war began, and Poland was forever changed; its soldiers fought valiantly against 
German forces, but were annihilated and forced underground or into exile within a few weeks. In 
addition, Poland was left without its most powerful and influential political and religious leaders, 
including Cardinal Hlond, who fled Poland in an attempt to reach Rome and “plead the Polish 
cause to the Pope.”97 Abandonment was a common feeling among Poles who looked at Hlond‟s 
absence critically. As Pease states, Hlond‟s flight from Poland as well as the Vatican‟s minimal 
efforts to defend Poland were interpreted as a “violation of the principle that the shepherd should 
not abandon his endangered flock.”98  However, despite Polish frustrations with the Vatican and 
Hlond, a heavy negative impact on Polish Catholic morale was not detected. Instead, German 
occupiers soon realized the difficulty of “subdue[ing] the Poles because of their „fanatical faith‟ 
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in the resurrection of Poland.”99 The Red Army came to the same conclusion throughout the 
Soviet occupation and for decades to follow.   
Poland throughout the War: 
 The losses Poland suffered during the war were extraordinary, as Soviet and German 
occupation resulted in the deaths of millions. Many Poles refer to the period from 1939-1944 as 
“Golgotha,” in reference to Christ‟s time on the cross; this is also synonymous with the 
“Babylonian Captivity” of the partition period. Sovietization policies forced the deportation of 
approximately 1.5 million Poles, whom Stalin believed to be in opposition to the Soviet 
regime.
100
 This population included thousands of priests, many of whom were sent into Siberian 
exile, and died in Soviet gulags. While the Holocaust eliminated virtually all of Poland‟s Jewish 
population, religious persecution was not limited to only Jewish people. This is most evident in 
the fact that nearly 20 percent of the Polish priesthood died during the war.
101
 Since Hitler and 
the Nazis were aware of the Catholic Church‟s ties to Polish identity and nationalism, they feared 
that the Church would unify Poles in a rally against the Nazi occupation. In order to prevent a 
situation of this kind, priests were gathered and imprisoned in concentration camps. 
  Probably the most famous and profound demonstration of Catholic virtue involved a 
Franciscan priest named Maksymilian Kolbe. During his imprisonment at Auschwitz in 1941, 
Father Kolbe saved FranciszekGajowniczek, a fellow prisoner, by volunteering to replace 
Gojowniczek and undergo his sentence to death by starvation.
102
 Not only did Kolbe save 
Gajowniczek (who survived Auschwitz and lived to be 94), but he also soothed and comforted 
the other nine men who were sentenced along with him. Father Kolbe provided his fellow 
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prisoners with a “protective presence” and “suddenly their cells, in which they awaited the 
ghastly final denouncements, resounded with hymns and prayers.”103 Father Kolbe‟s expression 
of his religious convictions allowed him to reassure his fellow prisoners during a time of 
immeasurable weakness and fear.  Selflessness of this caliber highlights the strength of Father 
Kolbe‟s beliefs and exhibits a sense of solidarity that he promoted among a group of people 
experiencing immense oppression.  
While anti-Semitism was fervent among some Poles prior to and during the war, men like 
Kolbe show that Polish nationalism took precedence over religious differences. Kolbe‟s sacrifice 
is a true testament to Poles‟ undying sense of nationalism sparked by their ties to the Catholic 
Church. This incident, in particular, gave Poles justification for remaining loyal to the Church 
through the aftermath of the war, and contributed to the Catholic Church‟s ability to preserve a 
strong presence in Poland. In addition, World War II changed the symbolism and significance of 
the priesthood, whose members were elevated to a position of true leadership and guidance. 
Stewart Steven once spoke to a priest who explained that the destruction of World War II led 
parishioners to seek leadership of an entirely different sort. Whereas prior to the war, people 
sought advice from priests about whom to marry, the war brought upon changes in the primary 
functions of priesthood. Priests were suddenly “asked to decide matters of life and death 
affecting the whole community, coupled with the kind of moral and ethical questions which [the 
priest] had never even thought of.”104 Father Kolbe is a prime example of a priest who provided 
guidance to his fellow prisoners, regardless of their religious affiliation, and provided much 
needed leadership in the most dire of circumstances.  
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The same can be said for the priests who participated in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. In 
an attempt to force German occupiers out of the city, the government-in-exile collaborated with 
underground Polish resistance forces (most notably, the ArmiaKrajowa) in Warsaw. While the 
uprising was ultimately unsuccessful, the valiant efforts of those who participated exhibited the 
patriotic nature of the Polish resistance movement. A priest is integrated into the Warsaw 
Uprising Monument in Warsaw in order to represent clergy members who, just as Kolbe did in 
Auschwitz, comforted the men who sacrificed their lives for the good of the Polish people.
105
 As 
a consequence of the uprising, German forces leveled the majority of Warsaw, destroying a 
number of churches in their path.  
The Church‟s involvement in the war was not limited to Father Kolbe and the priests who 
participated in the Warsaw Uprising. Irena Sendlerowa, for example, saved thousands of children 
from the Warsaw Ghetto through Żegota, an underground organization supported by the 
government-in-exile that was responsible for producing false identity records in order to save 
Jews from Nazi occupation. Sendlerowa, a Roman Catholic nurse and social worker, benefited 
from her connections with the Roman Catholic Church by using churches and convents as a 
refuge for children whom she smuggled out of the ghetto. She then found adoptive homes for the 
children, and kept records of them in the hopes of reuniting with the children after the war, and 
informing them of their former, true identities.
106
 There is no question that through its support of 
Sendlerowa‟s efforts, the Church participated in the liberation of thousands of Poles. Countless 
other priests, nuns, and lay people exercised their faith and courage in an effort to save fellow 
Poles from the destructive forces of Nazi Germany. This is not to say that all Poles, or even all 
church officials, aided in the saving of Jews; however, the Church‟s role in the resistance efforts 
                                                          
105
 “Warsaw Uprising Memorial,” 26 February 2013 
106Wieler, “The Long Path to Irena Sendler- The Mother of the Holocaust Children,” 17 February 2013 
45 
 
of World War II was significant enough to be discussed at considerable length. With that said, it 
is clear that the Church solidified its role as a predominant institution of direction and leadership 
at a time when the future of Poland seemed grim. As a result, the Church was able to act as an 
opposing force to communism and sustain its influence on Polish nationalism and religiosity.  
II. War’s Aftermath 
 Upon the war‟s completion, the “Big Three” gathered at conferences in Tehran, Yalta, 
and Potsdam to discuss and determine how to best tackle postwar issues.
107
 One such issue was 
the position of Poland and the other occupied countries of Eastern Europe. These conferences 
redrew Polish borders, which created an ethnically and religiously homogeneous state; the new 
ethnic and religious cohesion of the Poles proved to influence the role of the Church in a state 
whose hostility towards communism was certainly palpable. In addition to decisions concerning 
Poland‟s new borders, the leaders collectively established a legitimate Soviet sphere of influence 
in Eastern Europe. While some states such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia were fully 
incorporated into the Soviet Union, Poland was determined to be a Soviet satellite state. The 
“Big Three” agreed that free, democratic elections were to take place at the earliest possible 
date.
108
 These elections did not take place until 1947, as Soviet officials prepared members of the 
Provisional Government of National Unity (TJRN), and disregarded the existence of the Polish 
government-in-exile. This Provisional Government assisted in the Soviet indoctrination of the 
Polish people and set the foundations for a Soviet-supported communist regime.  The 1947 
elections, which were manipulated by Soviet officials, virtually created a one-party system, with 
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the Polish United Workers Party taking almost every seat in the Sejm.
109
  Poland was, once 
again, thrust into an environment full of political and religious animosity, as it was essentially 
subject to the policies of “foreign masters and bureaucratic opportunists.”110 
Stalin and his companions, however, underestimated the difficulty and feasibility of 
establishing a sustainable communist regime in Poland; Stalin famously stated that, “communism 
fit[s] on Poland as well as a fine horse‟s saddle fits on a cow.”111 Implementing communist 
ideals in a country whose people are among some of the most devout Catholics in all of Europe 
and are historically hostile toward foreign oppressive policy was bound to be a challenge. 
Regardless of communist attempts to curb the appeal of Catholicism, Poles remained loyal to the 
Church. As an institution deeply integrated in the foundations of Polish national identity, the 
Catholic Church and Polish devotion to it was not eliminated by the imposition of communist 
policies and ideals. Instead, the Catholic Church and its leaders, especially Cardinal Wyszyński 
and Pope John Paul II, inspired opposition to communist repression, and extended the prestige of 
the Church in such a manner that it outlived the communist era.  
The Establishment of Communism in Poland: 
 The communist regime in Poland was never quite strong enough to impose Stalinization 
in its purest form. As Davies points out, the communist movement was so fragile that the “only 
possibility [for survival] was to conceal [its] weakness, and to concentrate on the destruction of 
[its] rivals.”112 In doing so, communism enforced policies of rapid industrialization as well as 
farm collectivization through the Six-Year Plan. Poland was also transformed into a state where 
censorship was commonplace and displays of opposition were risky and prone to punishment. 
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The communist era left Poles in a position of vulnerability to which their history of seemingly 
constant struggle can easily attest. Poland did not receive communism well, and on a number of 
occasions, Poles unified in protest against ideology for which they vehemently opposed. 
The Church was certainly not excluded from oppressive measures; in fact, its influence 
threatened the legitimacy of the communist government, so policies directed towards the Church 
were considerably harsh. Immediately following the close of World War II, the communist 
government hoped to sever ties with the Vatican in order to “create a schismatic national church 
which, separated by Rome, was to submit more easily to political controls.”113 This was 
exhibited by Poland‟s termination of the Concordat of 1925 in September 1945. The government 
claimed that the Vatican violated the stipulations of the Concordat during the war; among a 
number of reasons for the termination was the Vatican‟s unlawful appointment of the 
Archbishop of Gniezno-Poznań, whose administrative territory was then partly outside the newly 
drawn Polish borders.
114
 More importantly, the Vatican failed to officially recognize the 
communist government, and in the wake of the government‟s transition to communism, the 
Concordat lost its “binding force.”115 In response, Pope Pius XII issued a letter to Polish bishops, 
calling the termination of Concordat “unjustified” and the Vatican “[did] not intend to attempt to 
disprove it since it [was] so patently false and ridiculous…”116 The termination of the Concordat 
left the Church in Poland “function[ing] in a legal vacuum,” where “no constitutional provisions, 
no law or decree defined its status.”117 
It is important to note, though, that relations between the Church and the Polish state 
fluctuated. At times, the Church was subject to state enforced restrictions, while at other times, it 
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was granted relative flexibility in its rights. In some cases, priests and other church officials 
“often under duress, blackmail, or even physical pressure” collaborated with the communist 
administration.
118
 These cases were the exception, however, as only 278 out of 32,000 monks 
and nuns were informers for the communist state in 1953.
119
 Prior to the 1952 Constitution, the 
communist government, after its efforts to break the Polish Church‟s ties with Rome, tried to 
create an atmosphere in which the Church would be swayed to cooperate with the state. For one, 
the Church was exempt from land nationalization policies.
120
 In addition, the state sponsored the 
creation of the Social Catholics, led by BolesławPiasecki; through publications such as 
DziśiJutro, this group aimed to “accept the revolutionary changes and reconcile Catholicism and 
Marxism.
121
 To the state‟s discomfort, Poles did not waver in their loyalties to the Church, and 
could not be convinced to support communism. The next few years demonstrated the ambiguity 
of the Church‟s relationship with the state. While Church officials pushed for state recognition of 
Church autonomy and a right to establish religiously affiliated educational and charitable 
institutions, the government stressed its insistence on limited appeasement of Church wishes.
122
 
As a result, the Church was placed in a position of uncertainty, and Poles witnessed the 
relationship between the Church and the state deteriorate with increasing speed. The Church‟s 
sovereignty was dependent on the status of its relationship with the state, and this was a 
dangerous position, since relations were growing more contentious over time.  
Communist Policy Regarding the Church: 
Following the termination of the Concordat and failed cooperation attempts shortly after, 
the communist government enforced its superiority through a number of policies. First, in 1947, 
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the state officially recognized minority denominations of Christianity because recognition would 
“counterbalance” the influence of the Church.123 While this was a relatively discreet way of 
undermining Church influence, the state took more direct and drastic measures against the 
Church as well. State officials found strict regulations against the Church especially necessary 
following the Pacelli-Spellman alliance of 1949, which expressed “Vatican identification with 
the West in the forty-five-year struggle of the Cold War.”124  This alliance was a manifestation of 
the Vatican‟s ardent anti-communist position, which “[forbid] all co-operation between Catholics 
and communists.”125 Attacks on both sides only seemed to elevate pre-existing tensions, and the 
state responded to the Vatican‟s anti-communist alliance with harsh policies meant to target the 
Catholic Church and its advocates.  
To the Church‟s misfortune, the state was quick to take advantage of its leverage, and 
developed policies that sought to eliminate the Church‟s influence on the Polish people. For 
instance, Catholic publications, such as the TygodnikWarszawski, were limited in their ability to 
publish and distribute to the Polish population.
126
 In addition, Church property (not including 
church buildings or churchyards), which was initially granted exemption from nationalization, 
was confiscated and nationalized.
127
 The rationale behind this was that the state needed “to 
remove the last vestiges of feudal privileges held by religious associations and at the same time 
to secure the material needs of the clergy.”128 Hospitals, formerly under the control of the 
Church, were also nationalized. Medical professionals in these institutions mainly consisted of 
clergy members, who following the nationalization, were permitted to stay; however, they were 
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eventually phased out and replaced with lay nurses and doctors. Under state control, hospitals 
were not maintained to the same degree as they were prior to nationalization; hygiene, for 
example, was a major issue, as state standards were far below those of the Church.
129
 Probably 
most disconcerting was the fact that the hospital administrations were replaced with members of 
the communist party, who had minimal or no experience in hospital administration, and were 
sometimes members of the communist secret police. Part of their job was to “carry on political 
propaganda among the patients and employees,” which only contributed to the disintegration of 
order in exchange for “traditional Communist chaos.”130 
Catholic charitable organizations were disbanded as well. The most famous was Caritas, 
an organization that provided goods and services to the most marginalized members of Polish 
society. It was especially beneficial in providing essential goods and medicine during the 
immediate aftermath of World War II. In addition to distributing food and reconstruction 
materials to Poles, the organization was responsible for supplying the Polish Catholic Church 
with “liturgical books, vestments, chalices, ciboria, monstrances, and even altar wine.”131 The 
state was fully aware of Caritas‟ good doings, and decided it would be to the state‟s benefit to rid 
Poland of the organization in order to decrease the Church‟s positive influence on the Polish 
people. As a result, Caritas faced persecution as the state accused the organization of 
mishandling funds. The Church responded in disbelief, claiming that the accusations of the state 
were unfounded. However, despite the Church‟s opposition, Caritas was turned over to state 
control, and donations to the organization diminished over time.
132
 The state went even further in 
its restrictions, as it narrowed the provisions concerning the church‟s involvement in the practice 
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and legality of marriage. The Marriage Law of 1945, for example, stated that a marriage would 
be deemed legal only if it was performed by an official of the Civil State Registry. This 
eliminated the use for a Church marriage, since all legal records of marriage, formally the 
responsibility of the clergy, were transferred to state officials.
133
 
Education was also transformed from an institution that required the instruction of 
religion for Catholic children in state schools to the establishment of secular education that 
promoted the ideals of communism. Religious education prior to the infiltration of communist 
ideology stressed the importance of partaking in religious customs. With this, students were 
obligated to attend Sunday mass and three retreat days each year, participate in Confession and 
receive Communion three times a year, and partake in a prayer at the beginning and end of each 
school day.
134
 In communist Poland, religious education was permitted, but had to be taught by a 
priest, when religious education was previously allowed to be taught by a lay teacher. As 
previously stated, the number of priests deceased drastically because of the war, so this limited 
the number of capable religious instructors in schools, and decreased the potential for lengthy 
exposure to religious education. The state intended to indoctrinate its youth through “efforts of 
secularization [that] mainly consisted in cutting the number of hours, issuing selective permits to 
only specific priests as teachers, eliminating crosses and other ritual articles from the classroom, 
and by the prohibition of religious rituals and ceremonies in schools.”135 In exchange for 
religious instruction and practice, the state disguised communist propagandizing in educational 
associations. A primary example of this was the creation and the state‟s sponsorship of the 
Society of Children‟s Friends, which “attempt[ed] to instill atheism and avowedly aim[ed] at 
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bringing up the younger generation as firm supporters of the communist regime.”136  By 
constructing alternative outlets for education, the state hoped to teach children about communism 
at a young age, thinking that the children could rally in support of the communist party as they 
grew older. In addition to this, the state coerced students into inadvertent support of the regime 
by “planning the most exciting [school] outings of the year…on Catholic holidays,” or by 
scheduling “crucial examinations…[or] Party events which [older students] were told (none too 
subtly) would affect their chances of entering university and their subsequent prospects if they 
didn‟t attend.”137 These examples simply show the strategic maneuvers implemented by the state 
in an effort to generate support for communist party; this, in effect, was an attempt to reduce the 
Church‟s shaping of adolescents‟ religious and political convictions. 
All of these policies were meant to suppress the rising anti-communist sentiments among 
Poles that were not only supported, but encouraged by the Catholic Church. However, 
Wyszyński, under significant pressure resulting from state mistreatment, recognized the 
importance in creating an official understanding with the state. This was manifested in the 
Agreement of 1950, which included many concessions on the part of the Church in an effort to 
make peace with the state. Concessions by the Church included supporting the state in the 
controversy regarding the recovered territories of the Oder-Neisse line, which was fueled by the 
Vatican‟s hesitation to recognize the Church in the Polish territories granted by the Oder-Neisse 
line agreement at Yalta and Potsdam. The provisions of the Oder-Neisse agreement involved 
expelling millions of Germans, many of whom were Catholic, to Soviet territory in Germany. 
The Vatican hoped that generating a peace treaty between Poland and Germany regarding the 
Oder-Neisse line would allow for official recognition of the Church in the recovered territories. 
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Until then, the Vatican was only willing to appoint provisional bishops to the region.
138
 In 
signing the Agreement of 1950, Wyszyński transferred Polish Church support behind the state, 
instead of the Vatican. In addition to this, the Church “pledged to support the government …on 
socialization of industry, and in the windup campaign against remnants of the postwar 
underground which by then had indeed degenerated to banditry.”139 In exchange for these 
concessions, the state promised to “guarantee freedom of worship, religious education, and a 
Church press.”140 Despite the agreement, however, the state refused to uphold its part of the 
bargain, and continued to practice oppressive measures against the Church.  
State neglect of the Church‟s needs was later solidified by the Constitution of 1952. The 
Constitution provided Polish citizens equal rights “irrespective of nationality, race, or religion,” 
where “infringement of this principle by any direct or indirect privileges or restrictions of right 
on account of nationality, race, or religion, is subject to punishment.”141 Moreover, Article 70 of 
the Constitution declared separation of Church and state, explaining that the “principles of the 
relationship between Church and State, as well as the legal position and the property status of 
religious bodies, shall be determined by laws.”142 For the first time in Polish history, separation 
of Church and state appeared in official legislation. In theory, the Constitution granted the 
Church relative tolerance by the state. In reality, however, the Constitution was ineffective in 
providing the Church with a position that reflected relative tolerance and autonomy. Instead, the 
vague wording of the document allowed for loose interpretation by the state, whose policies 
directed toward the Church did not lighten in their severity. The interpretation of some articles 
was so loose, in fact, that the state criminalized a clergy member‟s questioning of state behavior, 
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as it was deemed to be an “act endangering the interests of the Polish People‟s Republic.”143 The 
state intentionally disregarded its own policies in an attempt to weaken the status of the Church, 
in turn, elevating the status of the communist state.  
This was also exemplified by the 1953 arrest of Cardinal Wyszyński, who was accused of 
violating a pledge to punish priests who engaged in anti-communist activity.
144
 Without a trial, 
Wyszyński was placed under house arrest for three years, and was only one among over 900 
other clergy members who were imprisoned during that year.
145
 Clearly, the Constitution of 1952 
held minimal weight for the communist state, whose officials found little problem in using 
violations of vague laws as pretext for arresting priests and bishops. However, to the state‟s 
dismay, Wyszyński became a symbol of “both faith and nation oppressed,” as he refused to 
bargain with the state which offered his release under the condition that he resign from his post 
as Polish Primate.
146
 Instead, Cardinal Wyszyński‟s imprisonment and refusal to cooperate 
proved to the state that despite great pressure, the Church and its most influential representatives 
would not sacrifice their convictions for state acceptance. As Lewis suggests, a journal called 
Party Life pinpointed the role of the Catholic Church during the most trying times of the 
communist regime: “The Church developed best in the catacombs, and the element of pressure, 
even the smallest amount of religious hostility, is felt deeply by society. It enlarges the influence 
of the Church and arouses religious feelings and fanaticism.”147 
 Despite its attempts to do so, the state was unable to detract from the lasting prestige of 
the Catholic Church. Poles remained loyal to the Church because it acted as a symbol of strength 
and leadership. In addition, its intense opposition to the communist state provided even the 
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religiously indifferent with a sense of comfort. A common anecdote in communist Poland, for 
example, tells of a man who attends mass, but refuses to kneel. When his pew mate implores him 
to kneel as a sign of respect, he insists that he cannot do so since he is an atheist. Confused, the 
pew mate asks him his reasons for attending Church, and the man explains that he comes to mass 
because he is against the government.
148
 This anecdote is a profound illustration of Poles‟ 
association of the Catholic Church with the resistance movement. Even people who were not 
religious sought refuge in the Church‟s anti-communist practices. Official state policy, no matter 
how harsh, could not keep Poles from attending mass and professing their faith to the Church or 
discontent with the state. The Church came to symbolize what Poles considered to be their true 
national identity, and the state found itself in contest with the Church for Polish loyalty in the 
decades to come. 
III. Communism’s Impact on Polish Society 
 Although Poland‟s communist leaders used a variety of tactics in order to make the 
Church subservient to the state, they were unable to convince the Polish population to break ties 
with religion. The events of the second half of the 20th century proved to work to the Church‟s 
benefit. Communism and its legitimacy were beginning to unravel, and the Church‟s efforts to 
ward off communist control demonstrated strength and leadership to Poles who were in 
desperate need of support. This period in history produced some of the most influential figures in 
Polish society up to the present. It is the combination of the communist party‟s inability to 
remain a legitimate force of political, economic, and social progress and the Church‟s guidance 
and leadership that allowed Poles to fight through the oppressive decades brought by 
communism. 
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Poznań Uprising of 1956: 
 Stalin‟s death in 1953 loosened the grip of the communist “straightjacket” throughout 
Poland and all Soviet satellite states. Most commonly known as “the thaw,” this period in East 
European history exhibited strategies of “de-Stalinization,” meant to be “ „strictly an internal 
affair of the Soviet party and government‟ and did not have external implications.”149 Despite 
Khrushchev‟s denunciation of oppressive Stalinist policies, Poland and other Soviet satellite 
states were, by no means, immediately transformed into societies promoting the value of 
freedom of speech and expression. This was demonstrated through the 1956 Workers‟ Uprising 
in Poznań. In reaction to rising taxes and food shortages, workers and university students in 
Poznań organized a peaceful protest in which they demanded better working conditions and the 
end of food shortages. The protest was put down by Polish communist secret police, the UB, 
who fired at and killed at least 50 protestors and left hundreds more wounded.
150
 
The Uprising sparked outrage in Poland, and brought light to the fact that “the 
governments of the working class, as they called themselves, had failed to satisfy the most basic 
needs of the working class.”151 The communist regime was delegitimized, and a national uprising 
in October of that year demonstrated Polish frustrations with the communist government. The 
uprising proved to be beneficial to the Poles, who were introduced to “the flow…of scientific, 
technological, cultural, and intellectual information from the West” to which Soviet influence 
denied Poles access.
152
 Exposure to the Western world made Poles realize that life in a 
communist state was not as ideal as the party claimed. Instead, communism seemed to hinder 
freedoms of choice, creativity, and religion that were guaranteed to members of Western society.  
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 Upon the death of BolesławBierut, WładzsławGomułka became the new First Secretary 
of the Polish communist party. Since Gomułka was considered to be more of a centrist than 
Bierut, the Church utilized him in order to regain privileges lost during the last 1940s and early 
1950s. Following the reinstatement of religious education in schools, the Church believed that it 
could capitalize on the government‟s instability to regain relative autonomy. In addition to the 
reinstatement of religious education, the church “gained the right to build churches, increase the 
circulation of its newspapers, open seminaries, gain support for the clergy, and put an end to 
religious persecution.”153The appearance of state compromise was short-lived, however, as rights 
to religious education were disregarded and terminated completely by 1970, and religious 
persecution continued.
154
 Despite the state‟s neglect of Church demands for looser regulations, 
the Poznań uprising “mark[ed] the turning point in Polish post-war politics following which a 
stable replacement for the discredited Stalinism could never be devised.”155 Poland was on a path 
toward liberation from the communist regime, and the Church played a key role in this struggle 
for the dissolution of Polish communist power. 
Millennium Celebration of 1966: 
 In 1966, the Catholic Church in Poland celebrated its millennium, which demonstrated 
the extent of Polish loyalty and faithfulness to Catholicism. Despite attempts to dismantle the 
strength of the Catholic Church, Poland managed to sustain Church influence for one thousand 
years. This feat called for a celebration, which Cardinal Wyszyński launched ten years prior to 
the 1966 millennial year; in 1956, Poles participated in the rededication of the Marian Cult at 
Częstohowa for the 300th anniversary of the miracle of the Black Madonna. An astounding 1.5 
million Poles gathered for a pilgrimage to Częstohowa. Participants processed with a picture of 
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Wyszyński, who was still imprisoned at the time, and this symbolized the revered position 
Wyszyński held among adherents to Catholicism. In addition, the size of the crowd was 
unprecedented, as this event became “not only the greatest religious demonstration ever seen in a 
Communist country,… [but it also] served to arouse Polish patriotism, which had lain dormant 
for so long.”156 
Following Wyszyński‟s release from house arrest, the Polish Church coordinated events 
that led up to the millennial celebration of 1966. During his period of imprisonment, Wyszyński 
developed and planned for the decade-long preparation for the millennium in the form of a 
Novena. This included an “elaborate program of prayers, thematic sermons, liturgical 
celebrations, and a visitation in some parishes by a copy of the icon of the Black Madonna of 
Częstohowa.”157Wyszyński‟s buildup to the millennium celebration also included a 
predetermined goal for each year, which priests incorporated into their homilies during Sunday 
mass. Such goals included: ”Fidelity to God, the Cross, the Gospel of Christ, and the Church ; 
The struggle against national vices and acquisitions of Christian virtues; and The protection of 
the Mother of God, Queen of Poland.”158 To summarize, the replica of the icon, which traveled 
through the many towns and villages of Poland, along with the integration of Wyszyński‟s goals 
in Sunday mass served a clear purpose. The adoration of the icon as well as the implementation 
of Wyszyński‟s goals were used in the hopes of reminding people of Mary‟s position as Queen 
of Poland. In addition, Wyszyński strove to spark enthusiasm for the 1966 millennium. As was 
true during the invasions of the Turks and Swedes centuries earlier, this enthusiasm 
demonstrated the continued belief that Poland was the defender of Christianity; during the 
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20
thcentury, however, the Polish were defending Christianity against communism, “a toxic 
cultural parasite that would, unchecked, destroy its host.”159 
The state was fully conscious of the Church‟s efforts to unite Poles under the name of 
Catholicism, so it attempted to “upstage the church by organizing competing celebrations of the 
millennium of Polish statehood.”160 It went so far as to deny Pope Paul VI entry into Poland, 
preventing him from partaking in the millennial celebration. However, the state‟s efforts were 
ineffective, as over one million Poles congregated at Częstohowa to commemorate the Church‟s‟ 
presence in Poland. In the Pope‟s absence, Cardinal Wyszyński spoke to the crowd, proclaiming 
“ You [the Poles] are the personification of the Church. The more you are insulted, the more we 
love you…We…are united with you as one body. The bishops and the nation are united with you 
as never before, and this solidarity is our strength.”161 This speech demonstrates how critical the 
millennium was for solidifying the relationship between religious adherence and opposition to 
communism. In addition, Wyszyński emphasized the importance of religious leadership as he 
stated that historically, Poles have proven that they could “often be without a king, and without a 
military commander, and without superiors and without prime ministers and without ministers, 
but this nation has never lived without a shepherd.”162 The Catholic Church was a consistent 
symbol of Polish nationalism and patriotism, and its strength had to be maintained for the good 
of the people. A public display of this magnitude reinforced Polish loyalties to the Church, and 
confirmed overwhelming discontent with communism. As Weigel so rightly states, the 
millennial celebration of the Church “did not make the Revolution of 1989. But the Great 
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Novena helped make the people who made the Revolution of 1989.”163 In all, Wyszyński‟s 
speech made it clear to all who listened that the Church was willing to fight in the struggle 
between religion and communism, and its emergence as the spearhead of the opposition 
movement was only the beginning of a concerted effort to rid Poland of its communist regime.  
Workers’ Massacre of 1970: 
 Similar to the Poznań uprising of 1956, the Massacre of 1970 in the trójmiasto area of 
Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Sopot contributed to the decreased legitimacy of the communist regime, 
and solidified the Church as a supporter of the Polish labor movement and communist 
opposition.
164
 As a result of dramatic price increases for consumer goods, workers at the Gdańsk 
shipyards gathered in protest. Demanding to speak with Party representatives, the workers took 
to the streets, and marched to Party headquarters in Gdańsk. Workers attacked the headquarters 
building, and set it on fire.
165
 The protest spread throughout Northern Poland and exhibited 
Polish distaste for communist economic policy. The Party responded with full force, and killed at 
least fifty workers. This demonstrated the Party‟s disregard for the needs of the Polish people, 
and only served to delegitimize the regime. Following the massacre, Wyszyński issued a 
statement on behalf of the Polish Church, expressing the Church‟s undying support for the 
workers in all of Poland: “[The workers] had the courage to lay claim to the equitable rights 
guaranteed in all of law of nature…because the worker deserves his pay…There is an admirable 
proximity… between the Gospel and the labor codex.”166 Because of its compassion and 
understanding of workers‟ hardships and its support of the labor movement, loyalty to the 
Church seemed more appealing to Poles; they were not willing to accept the costs of maintaining 
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a communist regime in an environment saturated with civil unrest. In turn, the Church provided a 
sensible alternative for people who sought leadership and stability, and it secured its position as 
an anti-government force.  
As a result of the massacre, Gomułka resigned and was replaced by Edward Gierek as 
First Secretary of the PZPR. Upon his assumption of power, Gierek cancelled the protest-
provoking price hikes. In addition, in order to salvage what was left of a hostile and unstable 
relationship with the Church, Gierek promised the “return of 7,000 [Church] buildings, which the 
government nationalized in the past.”167This, however, turned out to be an empty promise, as 
Gierek‟s government approved only a fraction of the 1,000 permits Cardinal Wyszyński 
requested for the building of “urgently needed churches.”168 The inability of the Church and state 
to cooperate only added to the intensity of antagonism that already existed. The state‟s disregard 
for the needs of the Church, and in turn, the Polish people, was reflected through its policies, and 
only drove people closer to the Church.  
The communist government continued to fragment its support through another price hike 
in 1976. This resulted in demonstrations throughout Poland, along with the government‟s use of 
violence to enforce its authority and power over the protestors. Poland‟s opposition movement 
was growing, as evidenced by the creation of KOR, the Workers‟ Defense Committee, by Polish 
intellectuals.
169
 KOR promoted the importance of human rights among Polish workers and any 
other Poles who felt disenfranchised by the communist government; it became the “forerunner of 
Solidarity and its intellectual powerhouse.”170 The Church supported the activities of the KOR, 
and was able to express its interests with “increasing force and stridency against the actions of 
                                                          
167
 Ibid., pg. 120 
168
 Ibid., pg. 120 
169Diskin, “Epilogue: The Post-Gomułka Era,” pg. 232 
170
 Steven, “The Church,” pg. 158 
62 
 
the government.”171 Church support for the organization was effective, and produced a contrast 
between the concerns that Church officials had for the workers in relation to the perceived 
indifference by the state. In addition, the new alliance between intellectuals and Church officials 
created a stronger force of resistance against the communist regime. Despite their differences, 
the fusion of Polish intellectuals and the Catholic Church provided Poland with a stronger 
resistance movement. By disregarding theological fragmentation, the resistance movement was 
able to work together towards the common goal of dismantling of the communist regime. 
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Chapter III: The Decline and Demise of Communist Power  
 Throughout the mid-20
th
 century, Poland‟s communist regime was continually 
undermined by uprisings and massacres; the Polish people were united against the government, 
and remained resistant to unjust policies. In addition, to communist officials‟ dismay, 
Khrushchev‟s denunciation of Stalin‟s regime and the policies associated with it aided Polish 
efforts to rid Poland of communism. Through his condemnation, Khrushchev implicitly 
jeopardized the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism, opening up greater potential for political 
opposition and dissent. From the election of Pope John Paul II in 1978 to the Round Table Talks 
beginning in 1988, Poland‟s resistance movement gained considerable momentum, and was able 
to rid Poland of communist power. With the help of the country‟s most influential 20th century 
leaders, most notably, Pope John Paul II, Lech Wałęsa, and Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, Polish 
persistence and loyalty to the anti-communist movement became a success. This chapter will 
work to explain how the anti-communist resistance movement developed. In addition, it will 
identify the clear connection between the Catholic Church and the resistance movement in order 
to demonstrate the Church‟s true influence on the Poles who fought to liberate themselves from 
the control of the communist state.  
I. Pope John Paul II: 
 No discussion of Polish Catholicism is complete without a comprehensive description of 
Pope John Paul II‟s influence on his native country and its history. Commonly known as the 
“People‟s Pope,” Pope John Paul II personified the strength and depth of religious convictions in 
Poland. Ironically, he led the Catholic Church during a time of religious uncertainty in the Soviet 
bloc; communist policy refused to grant the Church full autonomy, creating religious antagonism 
that was easily recognized by the citizens ruled under communist influence. This antagonism, 
64 
 
however, was not permanent, as John Paul‟s performance throughout his papacy helped to 
release Poland from the confines of communist policy. 
 A personal anecdote accurately articulates Poles‟ love for Pope John Paul II: During my 
year-long exchange in Olsztyn, I spent a significant amount of time with my host aunt, Marta. 
One time, in the beginning of my exchange, I noticed that she kept a prayer card of Pope John 
Paul II attached to the visor in her car. Intrigued, I asked her what she thought Pope John Paul II 
meant to the Polish people. Her eyes became glassy with tears as she explained why Poles, 
including herself, admire him. Bloch describes this admiration by saying that, “so many 
foreigners became rulers of Poland, Poland finally [had] her own king, who was also the emperor 
of Christendom—a modern emperor, a people‟s emperor.”172 John Paul was and continues to be 
their Pope, and the Polish people take great pride in his accomplishments as the head of the 
Catholic Church, but more importantly, as a fellow Pole. 
 John Paul was the first non-Italian pope in over four centuries, as well as the Church‟s 
first Slavic Pope.  The timing could not have been more ideal, as John Paul was elected to the 
papacy in 1978, when Eastern Europe was still under religiously hostile communist control.
173
 
This worked to the Pope‟s (and Poland‟s) favor, as his influence in the region was immeasurable, 
partly because “the communists simply couldn‟t keep him out—at least out of Poland—without 
major international public relations problems.”174 John Paul‟s papacy reflected his focus on the 
promotion of basic human rights, and in this manner, he successfully influenced the organization 
and execution of a non-violent Solidarity movement. Through his emphasis on a humanistic 
approach, John Paul was able to encourage a type of resistance formerly foreign to the Polish 
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people: non-violent resistance. To John Paul, “the humanity of the human subject could not be 
reduced to race (the Nazi heresy); nor could it be understood as the expression of „objective‟ 
historical forces to which it had to accommodate itself (the Marxist-Leninist heresy).”175 His 
rejection of the oppressive forces of both German and Soviet adversaries expressed his disdain 
for violence, regardless of its purpose. In this vein, John Paul expressed to his fellow Poles that it 
was imperative that they leave their violent revolutionary past behind in exchange for a non-
violent, humanistic approach to oppositional methods.  
John Paul‟s speeches captivated all who listened, not only because he was an 
accomplished linguist, but because his words were effective; his messages promoted the value of 
unified resistance, and inspired the use of non-violent protest in response to violent oppression. 
A few words of John Paul‟s first speech as pope characterize his papacy; “Be not afraid,” he 
said, just as Jesus exclaimed to his apostles who were caught in a storm on the Sea of Galilee.
176
  
John Paul used his newly obtained prestige and power to express his support for fundamental 
human rights. This was an especially pertinent message in Poland, where these words signified 
John Paul‟s insistence that people release themselves from their inherent fear of communism, 
and unite to combat the communist party and its policies. 
 John Paul‟s papal visit in 1979, for example, lifted the spirits of Poles whose frustration 
with the communist regime did not diminish. Similar to the 1966 millennium celebration, John 
Paul‟s pilgrimage gave Poles the hope and optimism necessary to take on those who for so long 
denied them rights to religious and political freedom.  In many of the thirty-two sermons given 
during his visit, John Paul stressed the importance of unifying all Poles under the pretext of 
promoting humans rights. His words resonated with Poles, as he was “speaking and being heard 
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on four levels—religious, moral, historical-culture, and national—simultaneously.”177 He alluded 
to Polish hardship as a result of the Soviet sphere of influence. In addition, he emphasized the 
long-forgotten value of the Polish people as he said, “„remember this: Christ will never agree to 
man being viewed only as a means of production, or agree to man viewing himself as much. He 
will not agree that man should be valued, measured or evaluated only on this basis. Christ will 
never agree to that!‟”178 This statement, along with a number of others containing similar 
messages, undermined Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and gave justification for Polish determination 
to regain religious freedoms.  
 As previously stated, John Paul communicated how critical it was to create an opposition 
movement that was not only non-violent, but also unified in its goals. This idea dates back to 
John Paul‟s time as a professor at the Catholic University of Lublin, where he constructed a 
unification theory that identified the risk of conformity. John Paul acknowledged the dangers of 
conformity, claiming that, “conformity is more like uniformity than unity…conformism is 
unacceptable. In a situation where people only externally assimilate or acquiesce to the demands 
of the community, and they do it to avoid unpleasantness, the self and the community suffer 
irreplaceable losses.”179 According to John Paul, true, non-violent solidarity was necessary to 
break the communist status-quo. This was especially true and more possible, given the lessening 
of fear that the relaxation of communist policies produced. Due to the period of de-Stalinization 
under Khrushchev and the push from Pope John Paul, Poles were more motivated to speak 
against the government and its policies. As George Weigel understood through his conversation 
with 1981 Solidarity spokesman, JanuszOnyszkiewicz, John Paul defined the “we” of Polish 
society that was hidden under the fear of communism: “‟Then the pope came and the „we‟ was 
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clear: „we‟ are the society, and the country is ours. „They‟ are just an artificial crust.‟”180 John 
Paul was responsible for “exorcis[ing] the fear that kept the „we‟ from coalescing,” and it 
sparked the motivations for the Solidarity movement and subsequent demonstrations of 
dissonance with the communist regime
181
 John Paul‟s influence on the formation and evolution 
of the Solidarity movement cannot be quantified. He inspired Poles to take charge of their rights 
in an effort to hold the communist regime accountable for its religiously and politically 
repressive policies. In doing so, John Paul II created a legacy that illustrates his devotion to the 
Catholic Church as well as the Polish people.  
Through a conversation with Emilia Strzałkowska, my suspicions concerning Polish love 
and adoration of Pope John Paul II were confirmed.
182
 I described the experience I had with my 
host aunt who began to tear up at the mention of Pope John Paul, and I asked Emilia if this 
incident was an accurate characterization of the Pope‟s impact on Polish society. In response to 
my inquiry, Emilia gasped. She essentially told me that a question of that nature was absurd 
because Polish love and admiration for John Paul is so deeply embedded in the Polish identity. 
This is because it was “a shock for everyone that a country that [was not] supposed to tolerate 
beliefs [had] a pope.” She emphasized his role as the “People‟s Pope,” and spoke of his 
numerous trips to Poland as an act of reassurance for the Polish people who felt the weight of the 
communist regime pushing down on them. Emilia showed me her rosary as further evidence of 
Polish devotion to the Pope, and ultimately, the Catholic Church. She explained that the rosary 
was a gift from her great great aunt, who was a nun in Białystok and had it blessed by John Paul 
during one of his visits to Poland. Emilia carries the rosary with her everywhere she goes as a 
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reminder of her faith to Catholicism and Pope John Paul II. Emilia‟s devotion to Pope John Paul 
II and the Catholic Church is simply an example of one of the millions of Poles who hold John 
Paul II and his accomplishments as Pope in the highest regard. His contributions to Polish unity 
and the Solidarity movement create grounds for arguing that Pope John Paul II was one of the 
most influential figures of the 20
th
 century, and was certainly was of the most adored Poles in all 
of the country‟s history.  
II. The Solidarity Movement 1980-1989: 
 The Solidarity movement grew out of a widespread desire to rid Poland of its communist 
government and political ties to the Soviet Union. What began as a strike led by Lech Wałęsa in 
the Lenin shipyards of Gdańsk, soon spiraled into a nationwide attempt to gain religious and 
political freedoms from the Polish government. In response to unfair price increases in July 
1980, Lech Wałęsa and the workers of the Lenin shipyard organized themselves and went on 
strike. The strike spread to neighboring Gdynia before it swept the country under the name of 
Solidarity, which insisted on having the right to form independent unions with the ability to 
strike. Representatives of the Catholic Church were directly involved in the strike efforts, as 
exhibited by Father Henryk Jankowski‟s saying of mass in the Gdańsk shipyards on August 
17
th
.
183
 In addition, Cardinal Wyszyński expressed his support through a sermon in Częstohowa, 
in which he stressed the importance of maintaining “‟calm, balance, prudence, wisdom, and 
responsibility for the whole Polish nation.”184 The communist government attempted to spin the 
meaning of Wyszyński‟s words, claiming that these were not said in support of the Solidarity 
movement and the Polish nation as a whole, but instead, were meant to warn Poles against a 
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continuation of the Solidarity movement. This was clearly not the case, and Poles rejected the 
government‟s propaganda.  
The strike ended on August 31, 1980, when the communist government agreed to 
negotiate with Solidarity leadership. Pope John Paul II seemed to be correct; a non-violent 
unified movement could result in considerable change. Among the grievances Solidarity wanted 
open for negotiation were “church privileges, student influence on curricula, the right to 
positions based on qualifications rather than loyalty to the ruling party, redirection of 
investments, and political issues, such as free speech and the right to organize.”185 As Mazgaj 
states, support from various top church officials, especially Cardinal Wyszyński and Pope John 
Paul II, initially “[strengthened] Wałęsa‟s bargaining position” with the communist 
government.
186Weigel points to Timothy Garton Ash‟s assessment of Solidarity and its methods, 
which states that Solidarity was “‟a pioneering Polish form of social self-organization, with the 
general objective of achieving by means of peaceful, popular pressure combined with elite 
negotiation, the end of communism.‟”187 In this sense, Timothy Garton Ash was correct; 
Solidarity, utilizing Pope John Paul‟s principles of non-violent resistance, was successful in its 
objectives. However, this newly acquired bargaining power would prove to be short-lived, and 
throughout the 1980s, the Solidarity movement would not unfold in a manner that was expected 
or desired by many Poles.  
The Institution of Martial Law: 
 Tensions between the state and supporters of Solidarity increased, as the government 
recognized the danger in allowing the Solidarity movement to continue unchecked. Church and 
abundant national support placed pressure not only on the communist government in Poland, but 
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also on the Kremlin, whose leaders understood the effects that loosened restrictions would have 
on the Polish nation. If Poles were permitted to live in a freer environment, their freedom to 
oppose the government would likely be communicated through the demands of Solidarity. This 
movement received optimal support from millions of Poles, and from the perspective of 
communist leaders, Solidarity had the potential to undermine the authority of the communist 
regime in Poland. If the communist leadership in Poland was successfully challenged, the 
Kremlin was afraid that similar movements would develop in other states throughout the Soviet 
bloc, destroying the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately, the legitimacy of communist leadership in 
Moscow.  
With this, the PZPR rid itself of StanisławKania, who was “unable to cope with all the 
problems passed unto him by his predecessor Gierek.”188 In exchange for Kania, the party 
elected former military General WojciechJaruzelski to become the new First Secretary in 1981.  
Jaruzelski proved to be an effective tool for Moscow, as he took advantage of apparent weakness 
in the Catholic Church, and by association, the Solidarity movement. Following an assassination 
attempt of John Paul II on May 13, 1981, and the death of Cardinal Wyszyński on May 28, 1981, 
Archbishop JósefGlemp became the new Primate of Poland.
189
 To the misfortune of the Polish 
Catholic Church, while Glemp continued to promote the ideals of non-violent resistance, he 
“lacked the charisma and dynamism of Wyszyński.”190 The regime recognized the weakened 
state of the Church, and this provided the state with an opportunity to overwhelm Solidarity and 
its supporters with the introduction of strict policy thought to eliminate the success of the 
movement.  
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On December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski instituted Martial Law that lasted until July 
1983. Poland was essentially a military state, where Poles were forced to abide by a number of 
new laws. These included: 
the banning of all trade-union activity, the appointment of military 
plenipotentiaries in Government ministries, provinces, towns and even factories 
„to ensure the execution of order of the WRON,‟191 dawn to dusk curfew, mass 
internment a ban on public gatherings as well as on the wearing of specific 
uniforms and badges, limitation on the freedom of movement of the population, 
strict censorship of mail and telecommunications and the closure of Poland‟s 
borders.
192
 
Through the implementation of these laws, Jaruzelski created a state in which there was a 
definite distinction between “the regime that ruled Poland and Poland‟s national traditions.”193 
Solidarity‟s most powerful and influential leaders, most notably, Lech Wałęsa, were arrested and 
imprisoned. In addition to this, with the passing of the Trade Union Bill in 1982, which stated 
that “‟the registration of any trade union made before [the] law [went] into force [lost] its 
validity,” Solidarity was ruled an illegal trade union, and was forced underground.194 
Through these years of uncertainty, the Church played a discernible role in the resistance 
movement against Martial Law and the communist regime. Through its distribution of 
TygodnikPowszechny, along with various underground publications, the Church provided Poles 
with insight on the latest events in the country.
195
 More importantly, John Paul II‟s papal visit in 
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1983 placed a suspension on Martial Law, and broke Poland‟s “fever of hopelessness.”196 
Through personal meetings with Lech Wałęsa, the Pope made it clear that the Solidarity 
movement had full support of the Catholic Church. In addition, his refusal to cooperate with 
General Jaruzelski demonstrated the Church‟s unwillingness to collaborate with the state in 
exchange for loosened restrictions on Church practices. The Church became the voice of the 
Polish people, and did not compromise its demands for better treatment by the state.  
The Murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko: 
 The state‟s inability to rid Poland of its undying allegiance to the Catholic Church was 
exhibited by the murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko in July 1984. As an effective preacher and 
actor in the resistance movement, Popiełuszko grew to personify all that stood against the 
communist regime. Through his saying of a monthly “Mass for the Fatherland,” Popiełuszko, 
like Pope John Paul II, addressed the importance of non-violent resistance. His masses drew 
thousands, demonstrating the effectiveness of his words. Weigel points to New York Times’ 
Michael Kaufman, who expressed the impact of Popiełuszko by stating, “‟nowhere, in that vast 
stretch [from Berlin to Vladivostok] encompassing some four hundred million people was 
anyone else openly telling a crowd that defiance of authority was an obligation of the heart, of 
religion, manhood, and nationhood.‟”197Popiełuszko‟s messages urged people to maintain the 
force of the resistance movement, despite the government‟s scare tactics through Martial Law.  
He proved to be a threat, however, because on October 19, 1984, members of the 
Ministry of Interior kidnapped and murdered Popiełuszko by beating him, attaching stones to his 
feet, and throwing him in the Wisła River.198 News of his assassination swept the country, and on 
October 30, upon learning of his death, priests conducting mass, along with the congregation at 
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his parish of StanisławKostka, repeated a portion of the Lord‟s Prayer: “and forgive us our 
trespasses as we forgive those who trespassed against us.”199Popiełuszko‟s death reinforced the 
importance of non-violent resistance.  Poles reacted to the news not with bouts of violence, but 
with understanding and a desire to use the tragedy as justification for loyalty to the opposition 
movement.  As Mazgaj points out, Popiełuszko became a martyr of the opposition movement, so 
“Solidarity members coined an expression, „Father Popiełuszko died that Solidarity may 
live.‟”200 Hundreds of thousands attended his funeral, which “became a great national 
manifestation of support for Solidarity and the opposition to the government.”201 Despite its 
greatest efforts, the communist government could not dispose of Polish loyalties to Catholicism 
or the Solidarity movement.  
Round Table Talks and the Rakowski Act:  
 The outpour of support for the Solidarity movement sparked by Popiełuszko‟s murder 
was a clear indication that the Polish communist government was not going to outlive the 
resistance movement. Pope John Paul II‟s third trip to Poland in 1987, for example, inspired 
Poles to recognize the “true Christian meaning of Solidarity,” as the resistance movement had 
yet to overcome the adversity forced onto it by the state.
202
 Poles would discover this true 
meaning, though, as the state would not loosen its restrictions on the Church or Solidarity 
throughout the mid-1980s. In 1988, it appeared as if the state would have to negotiate, as strikes 
erupted throughout all of Poland. As was usually the case, the strikes were a result of discontent 
with workers‟ pay, but the strikers, along with the movements most powerful leaders, also 
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demanded legal recognition of Solidarity, claiming, “‟There‟s no freedom without 
Solidarity.‟”203 
The government seemed to have no choice; it continually severed ties with the Church, 
whose support was fully and publicly behind the Solidarity movement, so it seemed that the only 
viable option would be to agree to negotiations. The first Round Table Talks took place on 
August 31, 1988, and brought about “an agreement calling for unrestricted elections to 35 
percent of the seats of the Sejmand all the seats in the Senat.”204 The elections resulted in 
Solidarity candidates winning all available Sejmseats and 99 out of 100 Senatseats. In addition, 
upon his emergence as Poland‟s newest Prime Minister in Septemer 1988, MieczysławRakowski 
approved the creation of an unofficial Concordat, which was referred to as the Rakowski Act; 
this act would develop into official legislation known as The Statute on the Relationship between 
the State and Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland of May 17, 1989.
205
 This act, among 
many other things, granted the Church autonomy, the right to conduct mass publicly, the right to 
perform religious education, and the establishment of various national religious holidays.
206
 
 
Summary: 
 There is no doubt that the efforts of the Catholic Church on behalf of the Solidarity 
movement influenced the demise of the communist regime in Poland. A discussion of the 
Solidarity movement is not comprehensive if it does not address the clear impact of Pope John 
Paul II, Cardinal Wyszyński, and Jerzy Popiełuszko. Through John Paul‟s emphasis on a 
humanistic approach to resistance, and Lech Wałęsa‟s determination, Poles were able to develop 
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a Solidarity movement that would undertake the task of separating Poland from communist 
control. In addition, Jerzy Popiełuszko played a vital role through the course of the movement 
and Martial Law, as he encouraged Poles to fight peacefully against an oppressive regime. These 
men, along with the millions of Poles who persevered for the good of the country, enabled the 
success of Solidarity and the end to communist control.   
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Chapter IV: Conclusion 
 An analysis of over one thousand years of events since the Church‟s institution 
demonstrates that Catholic devotion among Poles is not only consistent, but it has allowed the 
Polish population to persevere through the darkest events in Polish history. Ties to Catholicism 
were a significant source of strength and motivation during the communist era, and especially 
throughout the Solidarity movement of the 1980s. With the establishment of the 1993 Concordat, 
as well as the granting of equal rights among religious organizations in the 1997 Constitution, it 
is clear that Church influence in Poland has not disappeared following the fall of communism. In 
fact, Church attendance and affiliation has decreased in almost all countries of the former Soviet 
bloc, while in Poland, it has remained at high levels across all age groups.
207
 
Personal experience has shown me that the Poles are some of the most devout Catholics 
in the world. KatarzynaKasza expressed her feelings towards Catholicism and her Polish identity 
by saying, “it is very difficult for me to differentiate between my Catholic and Polish identity 
and so I think they are interrelated and one in the same.”208 I argue and believe that her response 
is representative of the Polish population as a whole; of the many Poles with whom I spoke, each 
expressed to me that his or her Polish identity is directly associated with an identity as a 
Catholic. As Emilia Strzałkowska explained, to identify with a religious denomination other than 
Catholicism in Poland is “out of the norm.” A Catholic identity is so engrained in Poles that they 
hardly realize that it is surprising for foreigners. Throughout my exchange year in Poland, I 
traveled to many of Poland‟s finest cities; I even explored the smallest of towns. Cities in Poland, 
while they still maintain their European charm, are Westernized and modern. This is in contrast 
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to the towns and villages where roads are usually unpaved, and some houses do not have running 
water or electricity. However, what always struck me was the fact that, no matter whether I was 
in Kraków or Wójtowo, a church is situated in the center of town and is a prime tourist 
attraction. Never have I been to a country whose people sightsee by visiting churches and 
cathedrals. This is a purely Polish phenomenon which is owed to its rich Catholic history that is 
embedded in the identity of Polish society.  
 The Polish Catholic identity is a product of centuries of hardship; there is no doubt that a 
strong loyalty and allegiance to the Catholic faith has allowed Poles to fight through foreign 
occupation and oppression. Through this thesis, I have argued that this devotion to the Church, 
along with inspiration from Poland‟s most influential religious leaders, was essential to the 
eventual downfall of communism in Poland. The Church provided leadership and guidance to the 
Polish people, as it became a symbol of the Polish national identity. I contend that the Polish 
Catholic identity will remain interconnected for centuries to come since Polish culture is 
centered on Catholic traditional values and beliefs. As was evident during the period of the 
Protestant Reformation, much of Europe is once again turning away from Catholicism, and 
religion in general. Poland, however, will not do so because the Polish Catholic identity informs 
cultural as well as political decisions, which reinforce the seemingly unbreakable ties to the 
Catholic faith.  From the miracle of the Black Madonna to Pope John Paul II‟s call for non-
violent opposition in his papal visits, ties to the Catholic Church have not diminished, and it is 
for this reason that I believe the strength of Catholicism in Poland, especially during the 
communist era, is worthy of academic study.  
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